ACCOUNTING FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

This paper seeks to set out in some detail an accounting structure for the public sector of developing countries which will provide the information essential for development planning. The public sector is of course of special importance in planning because of its sheer size and its pivotal position for altering the contours of the entire economy. Yet the information available for this strategic area often falls far short of what is needed, and also of what could be provided with more effort.
The paper is divided into a number of sections, the first two of which are concerned with demarcating the public sector and with the nature of the accounting framework proposed. These are followed by sections dealing with the distinction between development and other expenditures; the need for separate financial information; public enterprises; the grouping of expenditures according to the purposes served; and income distribution. A final section touches briefly on some of the data problems involved in implementing the system. In addition, a full set of accounts for the public sector and its components is appended.     

Export Promotion Via Official Export Insurance

Proponents of free trade argue that export promotion distorts competition and undermines the multilateral trade system. In most countries export insurance is provided by the government and, consequently, is driven more by a broad range of policy objectives than purely insurance principles. This paper, however, shows that export promotion does not necessarily imply trade distortions and that most export destinations do not benefit from insurance premium subsidies. A significant policy implication of these findings is that the WTO and the EU are correct not to banish completely official export insurance.     

Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report

When intervening in markets, say to block a merger, competition authorities are constrained by the limited information they have about the social desirability of the available alternatives. Compared to ex ante control, ex post control is based on the more accurate information that becomes available in the intervening period, but entails temporary losses to social welfare and reversal costs incurred to unscramble the eggs. Through a toy model, we identify situations in which the competition authority finds it optimal to commit to forego the option of ex post review in order to avoid chilling ex ante socially beneficial mergers. On the other hand, the case for ex post review is strengthened if post-merger market conducts can signal the merged firm's private information about the consequences of the merger.     

Bernoulli speculator and trading strategy risk

In a continuous‐time model of a complete information economy, we examine the case of a “pure” speculator who chooses to trade only on forward or futures contracts written on interest‐rate‐sensitive instruments. Assuming logarithmic utility, we assess whether his strategy exhibits the same structure as when he uses primitive assets only. It turns out that when interest rates follow stochastic processes, as in the model of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992), where the instantaneous forward rate is driven by an arbitrary number of factors, the speculative trading strategy involving forwards exhibits an extra term vis‐a‐vis the one using futures or primitive assets. This extra term, different from a Merton–Breeden dynamic hedge, is novel and can be interpreted as a hedge against an “endogenous risk,” namely the interest‐rate risk brought about by the optimal trading strategy itself. Thus, only the strategy using futures (or the cash assets themselves) involves a single speculative term, even for the Bernoulli speculator. This result illustrates another major aspect of the marking to market feature that differentiates futures and forwards, and thus has some bearing on the issue of the optimal design of financial contracts. Real financial markets being, in fact, incomplete, the additional “endogenous” risk associated with forwards cannot be hedged perfectly. Since using futures eliminates the latter, risk‐averse agents will find them attractive in relation to forward contracts, other things being equal. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20: 507–523, 2000     

The role of public intervention in R & D

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) we emphasize the rule of uncertainty in achieving an efficient allocation of resources to R & D activities; (2) we identify and discuss optional mechanisms that are directed at minimizing the role of uncertainty in determining R & D decisions; and (3) we analyze the role of public intervention in R & D via a formal structure. More specifically, we explain why and under what conditions a risk-averse decision-maker will invest less than a government in research and inventive activities. Sufficient conditions that lead to private underinvestment in these activities are established. Furthermore, if the option of buying information exists, then we identify a set of private governmental contracts that may lead to the acceptance of a research project that a priori is unfeasible.     

An Event Option Pricing Model with Scheduled and Unscheduled Announcement Effects

There is considerable evidence supporting the time-varying distribution of asset returns. There is also ample evidence that scheduled announcement events such as money supply announcements (in the case of foreign exchange), earnings announcements (in the case of stocks), and crop reports (in the case of commodities), as well as random unscheduled events, can affect the level and volatility of asset returns. This study provides an Event Model for European call options which explicitly addresses effects of these two classes of events. This specification requires estimation of more parameters, but it could provide a more accurate basis for pricing options than previous Poisson jump-diffusion models. Parametric analysis shows that the standard models under price the options relative to the Event Model. The Event Model may be particularly useful in pricing short-term deep out-of-the-money options when scheduled events are present in the market.