On a general periodic preventive maintenance policy incorporating warranty contracts and system ageing losses

In this paper, a general periodic preventive maintenance (PM) policy for a repairable revenue-generating system is developed and studied. We define ‘ageing losses’ as the difference in revenues generated by an ideal system (no ageing) and a real system that ages over the same period of consideration. It is assumed that preventive maintenance slows the system deterioration process and therefore reduces ageing losses. The proposed model is general in the sense that (1) both the warranty contracts and system ageing losses are incorporated in the maintenance cost modeling and (2) the implementation of PM actions does not have to be strictly periodic. A cost model is developed for the buyer under two decision variables—the calendar time of the first PM and the degree of each PM. Numerical examples are then presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed model. Sensitivity analyses are further conducted to investigate the impact of model parameters on optimal solutions.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What makes a good case study? A positivist review of qualitative case research published in Industrial Marketing Management, 1971-2006

Business-to-business marketing research has a long tradition of using qualitative case studies. Industrial Marketing Management (IMM) has actively encouraged the use of case methods, resulting in many important theoretical advances in the field. However, debate still rages over what constitutes “good case research”. This article addresses this issue from a positivist standpoint. We examine the how authors address issues of quality in the 105 qualitative case studies published in IMM between 1971 and 2006. Four periods were identified: 1971-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2006. Findings demonstrate that, from a positivist viewpoint, there has been a steady improvement in how authors addressed issues of research quality in published qualitative case studies. Suggestions for changes in data presentation, reviewer expectations, the IMM reviewer feedback form, and the use of web-based appendices containing data pertinent to reader judgments of research quality are suggested.     

Corporate social responsibility: attributions,loyalty, and the mediating role of trust

This study investigates whether consumers’ perceptions of motives influence their evaluation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. The study reveals the mediating role of consumer trust in CSR evaluation frameworks; managers should monitor consumer trust, which seems to be an important subprocess regulating the effect of consumer attributions on patronage and recommendation intentions. Further, managers may allay the negative effects of profit-motivated giving by doing well on service quality perceptions. On the other hand, appropriately motivated giving continues to positively affect trust regardless of the performance of the firm on service quality provision.     

The political economy of redistribution under democracy

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. Hence, the corollary question concerns the conditions under which democracy is sustainable. We find that democracies survive in wealthy societies. Conditional on the initial income distribution and the capacity of the poor and the wealthy to overthrow democracy, each country has a threshold of capital stock above which democracy survives. This threshold is lower when the distribution of initial endowments is more equal and when the revolutionary prowess of these groups is lower. Yet in poor unequal countries there exist no redistribution scheme which would be accepted both by the poor and the wealthy. Hence, democracy cannot survive. As endowments increase, redistribution schemes that satisfy both the poor and the wealthy emerge. Moreover, as capital stock grows the wealthy tolerate more and the poor less redistribution, so that the set of feasible redistributions becomes larger. Since the median voter prefers one such scheme to the dictatorship of either group, democracy survives.We would like to thank, Daron Acemoglu, Marco Basetto, Alberto Bisin, V.V. Chari, Pat Kehoe, Onur Ozgur for very useful comments.     

The Bioeconomics of Cooperation

When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE). The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior, etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Scheduling jobs with values dependent on their completion times

The paper concerns two scheduling problems with job values and losses of job values (costs) dependent on job completion times. In the first problem, we consider scheduling jobs with stepwise values in parallel processor environment. In the stepwise value, there is given a number of moments at which the job value decreases and between them the job value is constant (thus, the value deteriorates over time). The maximized criterion is the total job value. We prove strong NP-hardness of a single processor case of the problem and construct a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for a special case with fixed number of unrelated parallel processors and fixed number of common moments of job value changes. Additionally, for uniform and unrelated parallel processors we construct and experimentally test several heuristic algorithms based on the list strategy. The second problem is a single processor one with piecewise linear losses of job values (the loss increases over time). The minimized criterion is the total loss of job value. We prove strong NP-hardness of the problem and existence of a pseudo-polynomial time exact algorithm for its special case. We also construct some heuristic algorithms for this problem and verify experimentally their efficiency.     

Value in business and industrial marketing: Past,present, and future

This article offers an overview of research on the ‘value’ that businesses and industrial marketers analyze, create, and deliver. First, value literature (up to and around 2005 and post 2005) is discussed. This review highlights the changes in our notions of value and helps to identify seven areas for consideration that should drive future research: value proposition, relationship form, capabilities management, value metrics, temporal horizon, innovation imperative, and tactical focus. Following this depiction of value analysis, value creation, and value delivery, we present a process model for value orchestration in business and industrial marketing. Three activities collectively form the basis of value orchestration, namely structuring activities, bundling activities, and leveraging of resources.