Joint outputs and real wage rates

The magnification effect in standard international trade theory asserts that if the relative price of the labor-intensive commodity increases, the real wage will also increase, as will the wage/rental ratio. This result depends upon the assumption that both activities are nonjoint—each combining labor and capital to produce a single output, so that if activities are joint instead, the results are in jeopardy. It is shown that if the difference between the share of commodity one produced in the first activity and in the second activity exceeds the difference between the labor distributive shares in the first activity and the second, an increase in commodity 1's relative price raises the wage/rental ratio. The real wage unambiguously rises in this case if and only if the ratio of the commodity output shares in the two activities exceeds the ratio of labor shares.     

Forecasting first births

This study is concerned with one aspect of the family cycle, namely, the transition from young married to young married with small children. The focus is on developing models to forecast entries into this latter stage for the purpose of marketing research. "Using ordinary least squares, forecasting models were estimated for (1) total number of first births, (2) number of white first births, and (3) number of nonwhite first births." Models are estimated for both the United States and California using data from official sources.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

Friedman's Money Supply Rule vs. Optimal Interest Rate Policy

Using New Keynesian models, we compare Friedman's k‐percent money supply rule to optimal interest rate setting, with respect to determinacy, stability under learning and optimality. First we review the recent literature: open‐loop interest rate rules are subject to indeterminacy and instability problems, but a properly chosen expectations‐based rule yields determinacy and stability under learning, and implements optimal policy. We show that Friedman's rule also can generate equilibria that are determinate and stable under learning. However, computing the mean quadratic welfare loss, we find for calibrated models that Friedman's rule performs poorly when compared to the optimal interest rate rule.     

Two–step sequential sampling

Choosing the sample size in advance is a familiar problem: often, additional observations appear to be desirable. The final sample size then becomes a random variable, which has rather serious consequences.
Two such sample extension situations will be considered here. In the first situation, the observed sample variance determines whether or not to double the original sample size. In the second situation, the variances observed in two independent samples are compared; their ratio determines the number of additional observations.     

General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically important feature) enhances efficiency. Appropriate subsidies enhance it further.     

Children's crusade

There's at least $16 billion available to help more children get health care. But on Capitol Hill, there's a bitter dispute over how the money should be spent. Give the states the money, some say, and let them bolster novel health care programs such as Florida's Healthy Kids. Others want to expand Medicaid.