The Euro and Internal Economic Policy Coordination

This paper reviews, mainly from an institutional angle, the objectives, forms, scope, levels, implementation and challenges involved for internal economic policy coordination after the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. In particular, it identifies six different aspects of coordination (procedures, exchange of information, analytical framework, monitoring, policy interactions and joint determination of policies) and analyses the rationale for coordination in eight different policy areas. After presenting some of the challenges lying ahead, the paper concludes that although an appropriate institutional framework seems in place, it still has to undergo its baptism of fire.     

Optimal savings with taxable and tax-deferred accounts

We solve and estimate a life-cycle model with earnings risk and liquidity constraints in the presence of tax-deferred retirement accounts (TDAs). We explicitly consider two very different types of households (with TDAs): direct and indirect stockholders. The latter hold stocks only through TDAs and, consistent with the data, save considerably less than the former, who hold stocks both inside and outside these accounts. We find that TDAs promote higher wealth accumulation but only marginally higher net savings. Consumption increases mostly during retirement, as desired, but the effect is largest for those households with higher savings rates already.     

Herding in delegated portfolio management: When is comparative performance information desirable?

We address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory, it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return. Instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset, because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract. On the other hand, herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically, resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that herding occurs, when the cost of information is high, information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse. Moreover, when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager's performance, they will not do so.     

Identifying the global transmission of the 2007–2009 financial crisis in a GVAR model

The paper analyses and compares the role that the tightening in liquidity conditions and the collapse in risk appetite played for the global transmission of the financial crisis. Dealing with identification and the large dimensionality of the empirical exercise with a Global VAR approach, the findings highlight the diversity of the transmission process. While liquidity shocks have had a more severe impact on advanced economies, it was mainly the decline in risk appetite that affected emerging market economies. The tightening of financial conditions was a key transmission channel for advanced economies, whereas for emerging markets it was mainly the real side of the economy that suffered. Moreover, there are some striking differences also within types of economies, with Europe being more adversely affected by the fall in risk appetite than other advanced economies.     

Politics, stock markets, and model uncertainty

The available evidence on the effects of political variables on both returns and volatility of aggregate stock indices is scant and mixed. Applying Bayesian Model Averaging to a panel dataset of 17 parliamentary democracies spanning the post-war period until 1995, we test the robustness of political variables in explaining stock returns and stock return volatility. While we find that the influence of political variables on excess returns is weak, there is evidence of some political variables explaining return volatility.     

“He just didn’t seem to understand the banter”: Bullying or simply establishing social cohesion?

Within the professional kitchen bullying is reported as widespread, aggressive and related to a significant retention problem. This research explores negative behaviour in professional kitchens and its impact on organisational commitment. A mixed methods approach is used employing a survey among chefs followed by semi-structured interviews. An exploratory factor analysis examines the underlying constructs of bullying and job satisfaction and data are analysed through Partial Least Squares. Our research highlights that bullying behaviour is experienced most by younger, more junior chefs. However verbal bullying, the form most strongly reported, has no effect on either satisfaction or commitment. Emergent themes of communication and inclusion illustrate bullying behaviour to be a cohesive aspect of kitchen culture. Our findings suggest behavioural impacts, rather than bullying characteristics, must be considered within their context in order to establish whether or not they are actually damaging to an industry.