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81.
We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups. 相似文献
82.
Alexander Haupt 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2006,33(2):143-167
This paper analyses the implications of international trade for non-cooperative environmental policy in the case of local
production externalities. A particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting
international spillover caused by trade. A tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad,
since such a policy reduces their variety of imports (due to fewer domestic product inventions) or their consumption of each
imported brand (due to higher import prices). Ignoring the negative spillover, non-cooperative governments implement inefficiently
strict standards in equilibrium. In contrast to this clear-cut inefficiency result, the impact of international trade on the
state of the environment is ambiguous. 相似文献
83.
We argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of ‘disappointment’ aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of ‘robustness’ entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation. 相似文献
84.
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a
class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph
games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like
this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that
each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties
in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations.
This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The
research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics.
Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme
for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the
Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We
thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 相似文献
85.
Alexander Gümbel 《European Economic Review》2005,49(3):599-626
We address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory, it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return. Instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset, because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract. On the other hand, herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically, resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that herding occurs, when the cost of information is high, information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse. Moreover, when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager's performance, they will not do so. 相似文献
86.
Alexander Plum 《Applied economics》2019,51(13):1411-1432
Are low wages a way for the unemployed to switch to higher-paying jobs? Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, the labour market dynamics of unemployed, low-paid and higher-paid employed men are analysed. Moreover, the respective (un)employment duration and occupational skill level are accounted for. Results show that in general low wages significantly reduce the risk of future unemployment and increase the chances of ascending the salary ladder, especially in the case of long-term unemployment (>360 days). Furthermore, the occupational skill level has a substantial influence on the upward mobility of low-paid jobs: individuals working in the initial period in a low-paid and higher-skilled occupation have on average an 11 percentage points higher probability of entering higher pay compared to when working in a low-paid and low-skilled occupation. 相似文献
87.
88.
89.
Decomposing Redistributive Effects of Taxes and Transfers in Australia: Annual and Lifetime Measures
This paper decomposes the redistributive effect on annual and lifetime inquality of a range of taxes and transfers in Australia, using a dynamic cohort lifetime simulation model. The redistributive effect is decomposed into vertical, horizontal and reranking effects. Horizontal inequities in the tax and transfer system are found to be negligible. The extent of reranking is greater in the lifetime than in the annual context and is affected by the equivalence scales used to adjust household incomes. If no adjustment is made to household incomes, reranking is about nine per cent of the reduction in lifetime inequality. However, if each child is counted as equivalent to one-third of an adult, reranking is found to be less than one per cent. 相似文献
90.
Joïlle Noailly Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh Cees A. Withagen 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):183-200
Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters
are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current
paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual
harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population
is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits
are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part
in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex
dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic
paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under
certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run.
Correspondence to: J. Noailly 相似文献