Why the Rigour–Relevance Gap in Management Research Is Unbridgeable

In this paper we discuss, on the basis of system theory, the rigour–relevance gap in management research and the proposal to overcome it. From a system theory perspective, social systems are self-referential or autopoietic, which means that communication elements of one system, such as science, cannot be authentically integrated into communication of other systems, such as the system of a business organization. Social systems can only irritate – provoke – each other, i.e. alter conditions in such a way that other systems are forced to respond. Because of the differences between management science and practice it is impossible to assess relevance of research output within the system of science. On the basis of our analysis we show that neither action research nor Mode 2 research nor recent approaches to collaborative research can succeed in producing research that is rigorous as well as relevant. Researchers and practitioners cannot collaboratively produce research, they can only irritate each other. However, sometimes irritations or provocations turn out inspiring.     

Local Linear Impulse Responses for a Small Open Economy*

Traditional vector autoregressions derive impulse responses using iterative techniques that may compound specification errors. Local projection techniques are more robust to this problem, and Monte Carlo evidence has suggested they provide reliable estimates of the true impulse responses. We use local linear projections to investigate the dynamic properties of a model for a small open economy, New Zealand. We compare impulse responses from projections to those from standard techniques, and consider the implications for monetary policy. We pay careful attention to the dimensionality of the model, and focus on effects of policy on gross domestic product, interest rates, prices and exchange rates.     

The rhetoric and reality: employer responses to the national minimum wage

The national minimum wage (NMW) was introduced to Britain in April 1999 amid much speculation. This paper considers the political reasons for introducing the NMW and the economic effects of doing so. It also addresses the issue of the additional costs created by the NMW and the strategies adopted by employers to defray them. The paper provides evidence from the hotel sector that suggests some wage gains but no significant disemployment effects. The value of conventional labour market models as predictive tools is questioned.     

The competitive consequences of hub dominance: A case study

Hub-and-spoke has become the predominant configuration of airline routes, with individual hubs typically dominated by single carriers. These operations have characteristics of natural monopoly; but dominance is a consequence also of advantages that cannot be subsumed under the rubric of superior efficiency. The carrier with the strongest presence attracts a grossly disproportionate amount of traffic and, secondarily, of the high fare-paying traffic originating at the hub. While the welfare consequences of the consequent price discrimination are ambiguous, United's acquisition of 50 additional slots at the slot-constrained O'Hare airport raised a legitimate Clayton Act Section 7 issue.Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Cornell University; Special Consultant, National Economic Research Associates, Inc. I acknowledge with gratitude the indispensable assistance of Gary J. Dorman in assembling the data presented here and offering criticisms, and of Scott Thomas. They bear no necessary responsibility, however, for the article itself.     

Endogenous growth cycles—Arrow's learning by doing reconsidered

A two-sector growth model is presented in which human capital is acquired through learning by doing. It is shown that, for both the competitive situation and the social optimum, endogenous growth cycles may be the outcome. Concerning the economic prerequisite for persistent oscillations we detect a bunching of investment at nearby dates leading economic variables to overshoot the long-run steady state values. This clustering of investment, for its part, may be caused by adjacent complementarity with respect to the stocks or by a sufficiently strong external effect of investment on the marginal product of physical capital or on the opportunity costs of investment.     

Embedded ties and the acquisition of competitive capabilities

We build on previous research that explores the external acquisition of competitive capabilities through the embedded ties that firms form in networks and alliances. While information sharing and trust have been theorized to be key features of the interorganizational ties that facilitate the acquisition of competitive capabilities, we argue that these mechanisms provide an incomplete explanation because they do not fully address the partially tacit nature of the knowledge that underlies competitive capabilities. Joint problem‐solving arrangements play a prominent role in capability acquisition by promoting the transfer of complex and difficult‐to‐codify knowledge. Drawing on a set of case studies and a survey of 234 job shop manufacturers we find support for the role of joint problem solving with suppliers in facilitating the acquisition of competitive capabilities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reform of the UK Financial Policy Committee

We argue that: The FPC should have a wider remit; a much broader membership (covering many specialisms); should be wholly independent of Government and outside the Bank of England; its aim should be to comment publicly and authoritatively on any possible areas of risk to financial stability while itself controlling few, if any, levers of policy. The rationale for these conclusions is that: Macroprudential/financial risks come from many sources; many of these sources are structural and outside of the Bank’s regulatory purview/competence; in a sense, the Bank gets to mark its own homework as regards issues such as the SMR, resolution, appropriateness of capital, effectiveness of ring-fencing etc.; many aspects of macroprudential actions have distributional implications, and hence, politicians, not the Bank or any other body, should take and justify, or not, these decisions.