Does final energy demand in Portugal exhibit long memory? A fractional integration analysis

In this paper, we measure the degree of fractional integration in final energy demand in Portugal using an ARFIMA model with and without adjustments for seasonality. We consider aggregate energy demand as well as final demand for petroleum, electricity, coal, and natural gas. Our findings suggest the presence of long memory in all of the components of energy demand. All fractional-difference parameters are positive and lower than 0.5 indicating that the series are stationary, although with mean reversion patterns slower than in the typical short-run processes. These results have important implications for the design of energy policies. As a result of the long-memory in final energy demand, the effects of temporary policy shocks will tend to disappear slowly. This means that even transitory shocks have long lasting effects. Given the temporary nature of these effects, however, permanent effects on final energy demand require permanent policies. This is unlike what would be suggested by the more standard, but much more limited, unit root approach, which would incorrectly indicate that even transitory policies would have permanent effects.     

Exchange rate and inflation risk premia in the EMU

This paper tests the effects of exchange rate and inflation risk factors on asset pricing in the European Union (EU) stock markets. This investigation was motivated by the results of Vassalou [J. Int. Money Finance, 2000, 19, 433–470] showing that both exchange rate and foreign inflation are generally priced in equity returns, and it studies the opportunity of evaluating the causality between these sources of risk after the elimination of the EU currency risks because of the adoption of the single currency. Our results show that both exchange rate and inflation risks are significantly priced in the pre- and post-euro periods. Moreover, the sizes of exchange rate and inflation risk premiums are economically significant in the pre- and post-euro periods. Futhermore, the UK and excluding-UK inflation risk premiums explain, in part, our evidence concerning a large EUR/GBP exchange rate risk premium and the existence of an economically significant domestic non-diversifiable risk after euro adoption. Hence overlooking inflation risk factors can produce an under/overestimation of the currency premiums and a miscalculation of the degree of integration of stock markets.     

The earliness of exporting and creeping sclerosis? The moderating effects of firm age,size and centralization

By using a sample of 644 manufacturing firms in four EU countries and five regions, we investigate the earliness/exporting relationship. Firstly, we examine the firm’s ability to retain LAN over time as it gets older and bigger. Secondly, we examine the role played by the firm’s decision-making structure. Our results reveal that exporting sclerosis does set in, as age and size of the firm significantly and negatively affect the earliness/exporting relationship. In addition, however, we find that centralization plays a role in the sclerotic effects of size (though only weakly for age), exacerbating their moderating effects on the earliness/exporting relationship. Our study claims to contribute to internationalization research by advancing the idea that LAN is not path-dependent but subject to liabilities. Beyond age and size, we add the more nuanced “liability of centralization” to boundary conditions for retaining LAN. Theoretical and managerial implications emerge.     

On the potential economic costs of cutting carbon dioxide emissions in Portugal

The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of reducing carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion activities on economic activity in Portugal. We find that energy consumption has a significant impact on macroeconomic activity. In fact, a 1 ton of oil equivalent permanent reduction in aggregate energy consumption reduces output in the long term by €6,340. More importantly, and since carbon dioxide emissions are linearly related to the amounts of fuel consumed, our results allow us to estimate the costs of reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. We estimate that a uniform standard for reducing carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion activities would lead to a marginal abatement cost of €95.74 per ton of carbon dioxide. This is a first rough estimate of the potential economic costs of policies designed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. At this level one may conclude that uniform, across the board reductions in carbon emissions would have a clear negative effect on economic activity. Hence, at the aggregate level there is clear evidence for a trade-off between economic performance and a reduction in carbon emissions. This opens the door to the investigation of the scope for policy to minimize the costs of environmental policy and regulation.     

Public Investment in Transportation Infrastructure and Economic Performance in Portugal

In this paper, we use a VAR approach to investigate the effects of public investment in transportation infrastructures on private investment, employment, and output in Portugal. Estimation results suggest that public investment crowds in private investment and employment, and has a strong positive effect on output. We estimate that one euro in public investment increases output in the long‐term by 9.5 euros, which corresponds to a rate of return of 15.9%. These figures imply that there are strong long‐term budgetary benefits from public investment in the form of increased future tax revenues. A closer look at the effects of different types of public investment uncovers the same general patterns. These results are very important from a public policy perspective. They suggest that the strategy followed by the Portuguese authorities of investing in public infrastructures is justified, both from a long‐term development perspective and a long‐term public budgetary perspective.     

The potential for underinvestment in internet security: implications for regulatory policy

With the continuing growth of the use of the Internet for business purposes, the consequences of a possible cyber attack that could create a large scale outage of long time duration becomes a more and more serious economic issue. In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model that addresses the economic motivations for investment in added Internet security and makes a case for a possible market failure in the form of underinvestment in the provision of Internet security. This result relies on the fact that the social value derived from consumption (which is at least equal to a fraction of the surplus derived from e-commerce) greatly exceeds the revenue at stake associated with the telecommunications companies’ and ISP’s security levels. If the ratio of social value to revenue at stake to Internet providers continues to grow, the likelihood of underinvestment in security becomes higher and some form of regulation may become necessary. We discuss the difficulties associated with designing and enforcing a regulatory scheme based upon mandatory security standards.      

THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND WEIGHT LOSS: AN EVIDENCE‐BASED SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Obesity and overweight are linked to diseases that cost society a significant amount of resources. While behavior modification can reduce the problem, instigating such lifestyle changes is an uneasy task. One potential way to reduce the problem is through the use of financial incentives. In this survey, we review the available evidence, properly emphasizing studies that credibly yield meaningful estimates of the effect of financial incentives on weight loss. We find that the scientific literature on the subject has not yet satisfactorily settled whether such a mechanism is effective at eliciting the desired behavioral and health outcomes. We therefore advocate a rigorous large‐scale randomized experiment to provide reliable estimates of the effect.     

Takings, litigation, and just compensation

A constitutional right to just compensation for governmental takings implies a right to a judicial review of the adequacy of the compensation. Thus, a property owner, subjected to a takings action, can threaten to litigate if he considers compensation insufficient. This paper uses a theoretic settlement-litigation analysis to demonstrate how the litigation threat influences the size of the compensation. In addition, it revises the theoretical explanation for earlier empirical findings that certain classes of property owners often receive more than market value for their property. It is also shown that the just compensation mechanism cannot guarantee efficient takings. Extending the basic model to regulatory takings, this paper demonstrates that recent changes in the judicial doctrine of when a regulation has gone too far and demands compensation has strengthened the litigation threat of property owners. It explains why political decisionmakers are moving toward settlements with terms which are increasingly defined by legislation.