Planning the leadership transition

According to the author, a successful leadership change should not be left to chance. Such a transition must be planned and carefully managed.     

Socio‐economic factors determining the success achieved among cotton‐adopting households in two magisterial districts of KwaZulu

The aim of the paper is to investigate certain aspects of the post‐adoption behaviour of dryland cotton farmers in the Ubombo and Hlabisa magisterial districts of KwaZulu. Particular attention is paid to the socio‐economic determinants of the success (returns per hectare) of the household cotton enterprise.

Multi‐stage sampling methods were used to draw a random sample of fifty cotton‐farming households from each of the two study districts. The data were collected by interview survey and analysed using principal components and regression techniques.

Results suggest that the success of the household enterprise in both areas is largely determined by the socio‐economic environment under which the producer operates. The most important success‐determining factors are those relating to the human capital endowments and economic status of the household.     

Reactions to ethical dilemmas: A study pertaining to certified public accountants

This study discusses how perceptions of ethics are formed by certified public accountants (CPAs). Theologians are used as a point of comparison. When considering CPA ethical dilemmas, both subject groups in this research project viewed confidentiality and independence as more important than recipient of responsibility and seriousness of breach. Neither group, however, was insensitive to any of the factors presented for its consideration. CPA reactions to ethical dilemmas were governed primarily by provisions of the CPA ethics code; conformity to that code may well be evidence of higher stage moral reasoning.Gregory A. Claypool is Associate Professor of Accounting and Finance at Youngstown State University.David F. Fetyko is Professor of Accounting at Kent State University. Michael A. Pearson is Professor of Accounting at Kent State University. He is the author of Enhancing Perceptions of Auditor Independence, Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985), 53–6, and Auditor Independence Deficiencies and Alleged Audit Failures, Journal of Business Ethics 6 (1987), 281–7.     

Applied Welfare Economics with Bounded Rationality: Public Policies Toward Remote Sensing

Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments.     

Estimation of household preferences for long distance telecommunications carrier

The competitive environment in long-distance telecommunications markets changed considerably with the divestiture of AT&T in 1982. A variety of providers appeared, offering myriad services. In this environment, customer selection of preferred long-distance carrier became more complicated and more important.In this paper, we analyze and quantify the determinants of this choice. To our knowledge, this focus is distinct. By contrast, the literature to date has analyzed the behavioral determinants of calling volume (local and long-distance) and the selection of local service options.In our analysis, we allow the alternative carriers to differ in terms of tariffs, reputation, quality, access, and specialized customer services. We quantify the interactive effects of these carrier attributes and customer demographics upon the selection of carrier. Price and income elasticities are estimated. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that it examines behavioral differences among households in equal-access and unequal-access areas. We find that households assured of the convenience of 1 + dialling for their chosen carrier in equal-access areas display more rational and sophisticated decision making. On the other hand, households in unequal-access areas display greater status quo effects in their decision making.     

The business cycle with nominal contracts

Summary In this paper we study the quantitative implications of nominal wage contracts for business cycle fluctuations. We address this issue using a model economy based on the neoclassical growth model supplemented by the assumption that cash is needed to purchase goods. We consider a variation of the standard recursive competitive equilibrium concept that is intended to capture the important features of wage contracting. We use this equilibrium construct to address three issues. First, we consider whether monetary shocks, propagated by nominal contracts, constitute a viable alternative to technology shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations. Our results suggest that, while monetary shocks and nominal rigidities succeed in causing output volatility of the required magnitude, the resulting data have properties that are inconsistent with several key features of U.S. data. Second, we consider how the behavior of the economy varies with contract length. We find that the volatility induced by both monetary and technology shocks increases sharply with contract length. Finally we consider how much rigidity would be necessary to match the volatility of U.S. output. We find that only a very small amount of rigidity would be necessary to cause output volatility of the magnitude observed.We have received helpful comments from David Chapman, Paul Gomme, Jeremy Greenwood, Gary Hansen, Michael Keane, Tim Kehoe, Lee Ohanian, Edward Prescott, and Warren Weber. The usual disclaimer applies. This research is supported in part by NSF Grant SES-8921346 and the John M. Olin Foundation.     

Take a risk: Preferring prevention over control of biological invaders

Scientists have argued that invasive species can be managed most cost effectively with greater investments in prevention. Further, under ideas like the precautionary principle it is reasonable to expect that a cautious manager would use more prevention relative to control because it keeps more invaders out. Yet, this is not typically done. In many cases, private and public resources are invested primarily to control existing invaders rather than to prevent new invasions. Managers frequently wait until after invaders have arrived and then scramble to limit the damages. We believe these paradoxical decisions can be understood by recognizing the link between typical human preferences for risk bearing and the technology of risk reduction. We demonstrate quantitatively how managers perceived to be cautious or averse to risk tend to shy away from prevention relative to control. This counterintuitive result arises because control is a safer choice than prevention because its productivity is relatively less risky: it works to remove existing invaders from the system. In contrast, the productivity of prevention is more uncertain because prevention only reduces the chance of invasion, it does not eliminate it, and invasion may not occur even in the absence of prevention. Managers' averse to risk will inherently avoid as much uncertainty as possible, whether the source of uncertainty regards ecological outcomes or economic productivity. Implications for environmental decision making are clear. In invasive species management, if managers act as though they are risk averse, their caution can backfire when it leads to more control rather than prevention. The social consequences of this choice are a greater probability of future invasions and lower social welfare. Our results suggest that social welfare is highest when managers were willing to “take a risk” with prevention.     

Taxation and the stock market valuation of capital gains and dividends: Theory and emphirical results

Dividends seem to be more heavily taxed than capital gains. Why then do corporations pay dividends rather than repurchasing shares or retaining earnings? Either corporations are not acting in the interests of shareholders, or else shareholders desire dividends sufficiently for nontax reasons to offset the tax effect.In this paper, we measure the relative valuation of dividends and capital gains in the stock market, using a variant of the capital asset pricing model. We find that dividends are not valued differently systematically from capital gains. This finding is consistent with share price maximization by firms but inconsistent with the fact that most shareholderspay a heavier tax on dividends.We also show that the relative value of dividends provides an indirect measure of a marginal Tobin's q. The measured value of dividends relative to capital gains tends to be higher during prosperous periods, as is consistent with this interpretation. We hope that this time series on a marginal Tobin's q will prove to be useful in forecasting the rate of investment.