Inferential Causal Models: Integrating Quality & Quantity

In-depth data analysis plus statistical modeling can produce inferentialcausal models. Their creation thus combines aspects of analysis by close inspection,that is, reason analysis and cross-tabular analysis, with statistical analysis procedures,especially those that are special cases of the generalized linear model (McCullaghand Nelder, 1989; Agresti, 1996; Lindsey, 1997). This paper explores some of the roots of this combined method and suggests some new directions. An exercise clarifies some limitations of classic reason analysis by showing how the cross tabulation of variables with controls for test factors may produce better inferences. Then, given the cross tabulation of several variables, by explicating Coleman effect parameters, logistic regressions, and Poisson log-linear models, it shows how generalized linear models provide appropriate measures of effects and tests of statistical significance. Finally, to address a weakness of reason analysis, a case-control design is proposed and an example is developed.     

Social Scientific Explanations?

Generally valid scientific explanations of observable social phenomena are still hardly available. By applying philosophical insights generated by Quine and derived from semiotics to social research methodology three kinds of context dependencies accompanying theory formation within social science are identified. The third context dependency is mostly not attended in theory formation about social phenomena thereby producing a ``connotation fallacy', which leaves almost all social theories undetermined and fallible. These context dependencies should be taken into account in the research design and be tested for using statistical criteria comprising a new methodology presented in this article.     

Regulating Banks through Market Discipline: A Survey of the Issues

Abstract.  The interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed New Capital Accord. This paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation. We start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms. Next, a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced. We evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have. Finally, we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism. In this respect, the Basle Committee has taken the right approach.     

A comparison of monetary family policy in the European Community

In a number of constitutions, in article 16.3 of the International Bill of Human Rights and in article 23.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights it is laid down that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. The following exposition aims to explain the monetary family policy and the extent of monetary transfers for the protection of families in the member countries of the European Community (EC).     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

The baby boom, the baby bust, and the housing market A second look

I re-examine Mankiw-Weil's (MW) claim that house prices will fall 47% by 2007. MW argue that the arrival of the Baby Boom generation at adulthood drove up prices during the 1970s. When the beginnings of the Baby Bust generation matured in the 1980s, prices softened. When this generation arrives in earnest, prices will collapse. I make three points: (1) The regression upon which MW hang their prediction has an implausible -8.1% trend, which drives their prediction. (2) Demand directly influences the rental price; the asset price (MW's variable) is influenced by demand only indirectly. I re-run MW's regression, replacing the asset price with the rental price, and their prediction disappears. (3) Relying on data presented by MW, I show that housing consumption rose during the 1970s, after adjusting for income growth. Just when MW say the asset price of housing was rising, consumers behaved as if the price were falling. Consumers were right: The rental price fell by approximately 20% during the 1970s.     

DETERMINANTS OF GOODWILL AMORTIZATION PERIOD

This study investigates whether economic consequences have an effect on the length of the period over which goodwill is amortized. It finds that there is a significant relationship between the size of the firm and the length of the amortization period. It also finds, when the only firms included in the sample are those reporting debt covenant restrictions dependent in part on goodwill accounting, evidence that the length of the amortization period for goodwill is related to the firm's leverage.