The Return of the Size Anomaly: Evidence from the German Stock Market

This paper examines the size effect in the German stock market and intends to address several unanswered issues on this widely known anomaly. Unlike recent evidence of a reversal of the size anomaly this study documents a conditional relation between size and returns. I also detect strong momentum across size portfolios. The results indicate that the marginal effect of firm size on stock returns is conditional on the firm's past performance. I use an instrumental variable estimation to address Berk's critique of a simultaneity bias in prior studies on the small firm effect and to investigate the economic rationale behind firm size as an explanatory variable for the variation in stock returns. The analysis in this paper indicates that firm size captures firm characteristic components in stock returns and that this regularity cannot be explained by differences in systematic risk.     

Do firms underreport information on cyber-attacks? Evidence from capital markets

Firms should disclose information on material cyber-attacks. However, because managers have incentives to withhold negative information, and investors cannot discover most cyber-attacks independently, firms may underreport them. Using data on cyber-attacks that firms voluntarily disclosed, and those that were withheld and later discovered by sources outside the firm, we estimate the extent to which firms withhold information on cyber-attacks. We find withheld cyber-attacks are associated with a decline of approximately 3.6% in equity values in the month the attack is discovered, and disclosed attacks with a substantially lower decline of 0.7%. The evidence is consistent with managers not disclosing negative information below a certain threshold and withholding information on the more severe attacks. Using the market reactions to withheld and disclosed attacks, we estimate that managers disclose information on cyber-attacks when investors already suspect a high likelihood (40%) of an attack.     

Safety survey of Iran's mines and comparison to some other countries

The increasing development of mining activities in Iran makes it necessary to have a closer look at the safety issues. Analysis of different incidents and damages in mines can be helpful for the adoption of suitable approaches to prevent the incidents. In this study, safety statistics of Iran's mines in 2011 and 2012 were assessed and important incidents and injuries happening to employees for 12 different groups of minerals were evaluated and eventually compared to the situation of some other countries. According to the obtained results, the average incidence probability in Iran's mines was calculated to be 0.18 for 2011 and the incidence probability of coal, copper and iron ore mines was greater than others. The injury rate of Iran's mines was 106 and 164 out of 10,000 persons for 2011 and 2012, respectively, and the maximum values of injury rate belonged to coal, dimension stone and aggregate mines. Also, it turned out that the fatal rate per 100 tons of production had the highest values in chromite and coal mines. Besides, comparison of injury rate and the fatal rate in Iran and some countries showed that the safety situation in Iran's mines was in a fair condition.     

The economics of demonstrations: The effect of competition on demonstration and pricing strategies

Demonstrations of new software products and their equivalents in the automobile industry, i.e., test-drives, are an inherent part of sales efforts. Yet the quality of standard demonstrations has been criticized as being inadequate and, in particular, too short. Heavy competition at the dealer level has been pinpointed as the main reason for short, minimal demonstrations. An analysis of business cases from two industries—automobile and software—indicates that, while competition diminishes demonstration efforts in the automobile industry, it has the opposite effect in the software industry where heavy competition induces demonstration efforts. This paper studies demonstration policies in a monopoly and a duopoly and explores the role of competition and costs of production and demonstration on demonstration strategies in these two market settings. Comparing the set of conditions between the two market settings enables us to determine under which competition will increase (decrease) demonstration intensity.     

Scale functions in equilibrium selection games

We present here an evolutionary game model, and address the issue of equilibrium selection working with the scale function of a diffusion process describing the dynamics of population processes with mutation modeled as white noise. This model is the same as the one in Foster and Young (1990) but with a different interpretation at the boundaries and with different mutation modelings. First, we justifiably assume that the boundaries of the solution of the stochastic differential equation are absorbing so that the first boundary of the interval [0,1] hit will determine the equilibrium selected. Then, working with the scale function, we obtain for 2×2 symmetric games and different mutation parameters, some new and interesting equilibrium selection results. The aim of this article is to describe another method of approach in evolutionary games with mutation which we believe will prove to be very useful in studying more general normal form games and different mutation modelings.     

Political Views and Corporate Decision Making: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and political beliefs in the United States. By analyzing the 2004 presidential election results of communities in which corporate headquarters are located, we establish a correlation between the political beliefs of corporate stakeholders and the CSR ratings of their firms. Companies with a high CSR rating tend to be located in Democratic, or “blue” states and counties, while companies with a low CSR rating tend to be located in Republican, or “red” states and counties.