Re‐Examining the Technical Efficiency of Australian Banks: A Bootstrap DEA Approach

This study re‐examines both pure technical and scale efficiency of Australian banks using bootstrap data envelopment analysis (DEA). The aim is to improve the choice of variables of the core profit efficiency model which is commonly used in earlier Australian banking efficiency studies. After we introduce the “interest income” over “net interest income” variable in the core profit efficiency model, the proportion of fully pure technical efficient banks decreased to 23% which is significantly lower than 81% which was reported in a recent study. This research argues that the main issue that has contributed to this difference is that improving the choice of variables significantly increases the discriminatory power of efficiency estimates. Additionally, emphasising on statistical properties of efficiency estimates, this study employs bootstrap DEA to provide confidence intervals and bias corrected estimates of pure technical efficiency scores of the sample banks. The bootstrap results show the importance of incorporating sample variation and bias in estimating efficiency scores. Earlier Australian banking efficiency studies ignored such issues. The new findings from the sample banks could have important implications for the banking industry in Australia.     

A study of service quality in rural ICT renters of Iran by SERVQUAL

The development of rural telecommunication services in Iran has been a major and national concern during the past few years. Towards the national planning and in a giant movement, 10 000 centers have been established in rural areas. Because of the novelty of such centers, the authors try to measure the service quality of the rural ICT centers using the SERVQUAL model. The results can be used towards the betterment of the services. Five hypotheses including tangibility, accountability, guarantee, empathy and reliability of service were examined. Twenty four ICT centers were selected in Rasht city as sample. Considering common sense or perception, 63% of the subjects evaluated the quality of services as average. In terms of quality, empathy was ranked as the ideal dimension followed by tangibility, certainties, trust, and guarantee, respectively. However, the least appropriate dimension of quality was given to accountability. In terms of expectation, the highest percentage of individuals, that is, 92% believed that quality of services was important, and believed that among the components of quality indices from the most to the least important items were: reliability, tangibility, accountability, guarantee, and empathy consecutively. This research showed that the SERVQUAL model can be used for determine the quality of services offered by Tele-centers in rural areas.     

A Markov regime switching approach for hedging stock indices

In this paper we describe a new approach for determining time‐varying minimum variance hedge ratio in stock index futures markets by using Markov Regime Switching (MRS) models. The rationale behind the use of these models stems from the fact that the dynamic relationship between spot and futures returns may be characterized by regime shifts, which, in turn, suggests that by allowing the hedge ratio to be dependent upon the “state of the market,” one may obtain more efficient hedge ratios and hence, superior hedging performance compared to other methods in the literature. The performance of the MRS hedge ratios is compared to that of alternative models such as GARCH, Error Correction and OLS in the FTSE 100 and S&P 500 markets. In and out‐of‐sample tests indicate that MRS hedge ratios outperform the other models in reducing portfolio risk in the FTSE 100 market. In the S&P 500 market the MRS model outperforms the other hedging strategies only within sample. Overall, the results indicate that by using MRS models market agents may be able to increase the performance of their hedges, measured in terms of variance reduction and increase in their utility. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:649–674, 2004     

Harvesting to Extinction: Is It Socially Rational?

This paper presents a critique of the neoclassical view of the optimal use of renewable resources and offers an alternative view based on the method of classical thermodynamics. The presentation is forwarded via the issue of harvesting to extinction. Based on simple models, the traditional theory suggests that society would benefit from wiping out any renewable resource whose intrinsic growth rate, though positive, is smaller than the social rate of time preference. The latter is the rate society is using to discount its future benefits and costs. To bypass this ecologically implausible outcome, the simplistic assumptions have been modified in various ways. For example, either the costs or the benefits of harvesting have been made to depend on the stock of the resource as well as on the yield. The modifications offered make society less prone to wipe out resources intentionally, but they still disregard a more fundamental difficulty: The traditional theory is not consistent with the second law of thermodynamics; it describes a process that defies the second law, which no known system is able to be undergoing. No doubt, the theory should be challenged first and foremost on this ground, but none of the offered modifications is capable of annulling this inconsistency. A deeper change is needed because the social values of the resource as perceived by a society that behaves in manners consistent with the second law and as defined by the traditional theory necessarily differ. The paper identifies the socially consistent value and shows that harvesting to extinction is never optimal socially. Were society to follow the socially inconsistent value, it would always underestimate the importance of self-sustained resources. However, the unlikely refutability of the second law turns this possibility and the socially favored extinctions into arguable outcomes of an untenable theory rather than undesirable outcomes of a sound theory. Potentially growing renewable resources are wiped out in real life for various reasons, but when they are preyed to extinction, their unfortunate fate is an outcome of the dynamics of a socially unregulated system rather than a social objective coming to fruition. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle

A striking feature of U.S. data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age. This paper asks if individual-specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation. We find that it can. We construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes. Earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the U.S. Panel Study on Income Dynamics. Consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey. The total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years. In welfare terms, the latter is found to be more important than the former.     

Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset Pricing Puzzles

We model consumption and dividend growth rates as containing (1) a small long‐run predictable component, and (2) fluctuating economic uncertainty (consumption volatility). These dynamics, for which we provide empirical support, in conjunction with Epstein and Zin's (1989) preferences, can explain key asset markets phenomena. In our economy, financial markets dislike economic uncertainty and better long‐run growth prospects raise equity prices. The model can justify the equity premium, the risk‐free rate, and the volatility of the market return, risk‐free rate, and the price–dividend ratio. As in the data, dividend yields predict returns and the volatility of returns is time‐varying.     

Strategic intergenerational bequests with stochastic convex production

Summary This note reconsiders the well-known model of strategic bequest/ altruistic growth, but with stochastic production satisfying a strong convexity condition: The probability that the next stock exceeds any given level is concave in investment. Existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium consumption schedule, which is continuous and with all slopes in [0,1], is established. Under smooth data and interiority assumptions, this schedule is differentiable, and marginal consumption is in (0,1). This property allows for a rigorous and straightforward treatment of the equilibrium characterization problem.The author is grateful to Wolfgang Leininger for helpful discussions on the subject of this paper. This research work was carried out while the author was visiting C.O.R.E., Belgium and the University of Dortmund, Germany. The author wishes to thank both institutions for providing a great work environment as well as financial support from the projects Markets as Games and Marktstruktut und Gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung, respectively.     

Asymmetric Regulation of Identical Polluters in Oligopoly Models

Studies of optimal second-best environmental regulation of identical polluting agents have invariably ignored potentially welfare-improving asymmetric regulation by imposing equal regulatory treatment of identical firms at the outset. Yet, cost asymmetry between oligopoly firms may well give rise to private as well as social gains. A trade-off is demonstrated for the regulator, between private costs savings and additional social costs when asymmetric treatment is allowed. Asymmetry is indeed optimal for a range of plausible parameter values. Further, it is demonstrated that for a broad class of abatement cost functions, there is scope for increasing welfare while keeping both total output and total emission constant. Some motivating policy issues are discussed in light of the results, including international harmonization and global carbon dioxide reduction.     

Creditor control rights and firm investment policy

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.