Welfare Effects of Changing Technological Efficency in Regulated Open-Access Fisheries

Environmental and Resource Economics - Small-scale fisheries often operate under conditions of regulated open access; that is, the fishery is subject to natural or regulatory constraints on fishing...     

Career success schemas and their contextual embeddedness: A comparative configurational perspective

We introduce career success schemas as critical for understanding how people in different contexts perceive and understand career success. Using a comparative configurational approach, we show, in a study of 13 countries, that two structural characteristics of career success schemas—complexity and convergence—differ across country contexts and are embedded in specific configurations of institutional factors. Adopting complexity and convergence as primary dimensions, we propose a taxonomy of career success schemas at the country level. Based on this taxonomy, we contribute to the understanding of subjective career success across countries, discuss the importance of schemas for organisational career systems in multinational enterprises, and propose specific guidelines for future comparative careers research.     

An Experimental Study of Influences of Performance-Related Payments on Timing of Delegated Stock Purchases

Performance-related bonuses are important tools for investment organizations to incentivize stock traders. Yet, two experiments indicate that bonuses rewarding short-term performance may lead to worse timing of purchases. The authors propose that hyperbolic time discounting makes participants set lower aspired purchase prices for short-term (decreasing percentage) bonuses than for long-term (increasing percentage) bonuses. For this reason purchases are made earlier for decreasing than increasing percentage bonuses, earlier for decreasing than random prices, and earlier for high price volatility than for low price volatility. Neither purchases at the lowest price or highest bonus are attained. Hyperbolic time discounting may account for bubbles observed in experimental double-auction markets.     

Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts

The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a public procurement auction of road markings in Sweden. Bidders are asymmetric in their cost functions; some exhibit decreasing average costs of winning more than one contract, whereas other bidders have increasing average cost functions. The combinatorial bidding mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by a field test of a combinatorial procurement auction of road markings.     

Measurement error in causal analysis of panel data: Attenuated versus inflated relationships

The presence of random measurement error is commonly thought to cause attenuation of statistical relationships. While this is an unquestionable truth in bivariate analysis, it cannot be generalized to the multivariate case without qualification. This paper shows that measurement error may give rise to overestimates of parameters in causal analysis whenever there is more than one independent variable and the independent variables are correlated. If the independent variables are not measured with the same amount of reliability, there may also be considerable error in estimates of the relative magnitude of their impact. Both problems are particularly serious when the amount of measurement error is large relative to some of the causal effects such as in panel analysis with lagged dependent variables.     

Price characterization of stable allocations in exchange economies with externalities

A pure exchange economy where the consumers have utility functions U_i(v₁(x₁),…, v_m(x_m)) for i = 1,…, m and where x_j is the consumption of consumer j, is studied. U_i may be nonincreasing or nondecreasing in v_j for j ≠ i. i is said to be nonbenevolent or nonmalevolent towards j, accordingly.An allocation is stable if no coalition can redistribute what it receives in the allocation to get an allocation which is preferred, given the consumptions of the consumers in the complementary coalition. Results concerning the relation among the Paretooptimal, stable and equilibrium allocations (under different definitions of equilibrium) are given. In particular, it turns out that in case every consumer is non-benevolent towards every other consumer, the classical results, concerning the relation between Paretooptimal allocations and equilibrium allocations, can be generalized in a satisfactory way.