Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

Prescribed conditional interaction structure models with application to the analysis of mobility tables

The present paper considers some new models for the analysis of multidimensional contigency tables. Although the theoretical background used here appeared already in Haberman (1974), prescribed conditional interaction (PCIN) models were introduced by Rudas (1987) and their mathematical properties were worked out by Leimer and Rudas (1988). These models are defined by prescribing the values of certain conditional interactions in the contingency table. Conditional interaction is defined here as the logarithm of an appropriately defined conditional odds ratio. This conditional odds ratio is a conditional version of a generalization of the well known odds ratio of a 2×2 table and that of the three factor interaction term of a 2×2×2 table and applies to any number of dimensions and any number of categories of the variables. The well known log-linear (LL) models are special PCIN models. Estimated frequencies under PCIN models and tests of fit can be computed using existing statistical software (e.g. BMDP). The paper describes the class of PCIN models and compares it to the class of association models of Goodman (1981). As LL models are widely used in the analysis of social mobility tables, application of more general PCIN models is illustrated.     

Aggregation effects on price and expenditure elasticities in a quadratic almost ideal demand system

Abstract.  While it is well known that demand elasticities calculated at the macro level will in general differ from those calculated at the micro level because of aggregation effects, there remain the questions of how large the effects are and how they vary with the degree of inequality in the income distribution. We explore these questions with models based on a quadratic version of the Almost Ideal Demand System. We investigate the elasticity differences theoretically and then calibrate the models and generate numerical results, using income data for seven countries with widely different distributions. The aggregation effects are found generally to be rather small, even with highly unequal income distributions.     

The Geopolitics of Protected Areas

ABSTRACT

The conservation enterprise is embedded in ideas of the environment through which it promotes a vision of the world and the relations between the non-human and human. The papers in this forum analyse conservation from various vantage points to draw the links between geopolitics and conservation. The authors use three themes to demonstrate these links. The first theme draws on the concept of environmentality to show the mobilization of ecological rationalities and power towards the creation of protected areas. The second pays attention to networks formed across the distance, and how they influence the location and governance of protected areas. The third focuses on the strategies the conservation lobby uses to align local identities with global conservation ideals and goals. Collectively, these themes highlight features of conservation geopolitics.     

Geometrical Interpretation of the Mean and the Constant in a Box-Jenkins Time Series Model

Certain manuals and computer programs mistakenly identify the mean with the constant in Box-Jenkins time series models. In this paper, it will be shown that (a) the mean and the constant have different values in autoregressive models, and (b) they have an algebraic and graphical relationship.     

Aggregation of Directional Distance Functions and Industrial Efficiency

Three main objectives are pursued in this paper. First, we intend to analyze the aggregation problem of directional distance functions from a constructive viewpoint. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the structural properties of the production technology and of the nature of groups of firms. Indeed, exact additive aggregation holds for a linear technology and for a direction solely defined in the output space. Second, since these conditions are somewhat restrictive, we are interested in providing a measure for the aggregation bias through the relationship between industrial and structural technical efficiency. Finally, we show that this aggregation bias is a lower bound for industrial allocative efficiency.     

Does trade liberalization harm the environment? A new test

Some believe that relatively lenient environmental standards give developing countries a comparative advantage in pollution–intensive goods. Thus, freer trade will harm their environment. This paper brings together the literature on openness and growth, and on the environmental Kuznet’s curve, to demonstrate that the opposite may be true. A simultaneous–equations system is derived which incorporates multiple effects of trade liberalization on the environment. Estimation using pooled provincial data on Chinese water pollution, suggests that freer trade aggravates environmental damage via the terms of trade, but mitigates it via income growth. Simulations suggest that the net effect in China was beneficial. JEL Classification: Fl3, Q28, 0l9 Est–ce que la libéralisation du commerce est nuisible pour l’environnement? Un nouveau test. Certains croient que des normes environnementales relativement peu contraignantes donnent un avantage comparatif aux pays en voie de développement dans la production de biens qui polluent intensivement. Donc, un commerce plus libre contribuera à nuire à l’environnement. Ce mémoire synthétise la littérature spécialisée sur l’ouverture des marchés et la croissance, ainsi que sur la courbe de Kuznets, pour montrer que l’inverse est vrai. On dérive un système d’équations simultanées qui incorpore les multiples effets de la libéralisation du commerce sur l’environnement. La calibration de ce système, en utilisant de manière intégrée les données provinciales de pollution de l’eau en Chine, suggère qu’un commerce plus libre aggrave l’état de l’environnement par le truchement du jeu des termes d’échange, mais que cet effet est mitigé par l’effet de croissance des revenus. Des simulations suggèrent que l’effet net en Chine est positif.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DOWNSTREAM ENTRY BARRIERS*

We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive.