Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation

The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms’ investments in process innovations. More intense competition corresponds to an increase in the number of firms or a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition. We carry out experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. An increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments, whereas a switch from Cournot to Bertrand increases investments, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case. The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are implemented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented. However, the positive effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition is more pronounced in the former case.     

Toward a Horizonal Theory of Justice: Efficiency,Equity, Rights and Capabilities in a Free Market Economy

The theory of planning horizons and their relation to pricing, conscience and learning has been explored in some detail in terms of efficiency attributes and ecological health (Jennings 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 39:365-373, 2005, 2007a, b, 2008a). This paper addresses the equity implications of planning horizons in terms of the social role and importance of justice, rights and capabilities in a free market economy. From my earlier work, cooperation—not competition—is seen as the means to longer and broader horizons in an efficiency frame, mitigating any alleged tradeoff against equity issues. The impact of longer horizons on fairness and justice in terms of intentions and outcomes along with rights and capabilities still remains unexplored. This paper reviews the normative aspects of planning horizons, showing how ethical and ecological conscience spreads with horizon effects, strengthening goals of fairness and the internalization of social effects. In this setting, capabilities and empowerment are enhanced by respect for human rights, as social conscience spreads through interhorizonal complementarities. The features of a long-horizon world differ from myopic contexts, specifically in the relation of efficiency to other goals. This paper examines that difference in terms of its equity aspects, with regard to social justice and the role of rights and capabilities in economic cultures.     

Who pays taxes? Liturgies and the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Antidosis</Emphasis> procedure in Ancient Athens

Ancient Athens developed a constitutional democracy. A core, time invariant political economy problem is that of providing public services when wealth is imperfectly know. I model theoretically a unique institution developed in Ancient Athens known as the Antidosis. It allowed a citizen on the list of tax-payers to challenge a citizen not contributing to replace him and make the public goods contribution. The challenged citizen, rather than allow the claim to go before a jury trial, could choose to swap wealth with the accusing tax payer. I argue this acts as a screening mechanism and improves upon the asymmetric information problem the government has in identifying who is indeed those who have the highest wealth to provide the tax revenue to finance the public services.     

Intra Eurozone Foreign Direct Investment and Deflation

After the recent economic turmoil, besides the severe recession that hit most European Union (EU) countries, and the resulting downward trend in inflation, foreign direct investment (FDI) levels in certain EU countries have bounced back. Hence, we evaluate the effect of deflation on intra-Eurozone FDI. Even though deflation tends to cause a negative effect on investment, low production cost opportunities may arise, thus attracting inward FDI. Using panel data that span from 2003 to 2015, we initially estimate an FDI equation that incorporates deflation as a pre-determined variable and, consequently, a two-equation model that treats both FDI and deflation as endogenous variables. Our results suggest that deflation in periphery Eurozone countries does not deter FDI flows from core to periphery Eurozone countries.     

Survey-based forecast distributions for Euro Area growth and inflation: ensembles versus histograms

Ensemble methods can be used to construct a forecast distribution from a collection of point forecasts. They are used extensively in meteorology, but have received little direct attention in economics. In a real-time analysis of the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, we compare ensemble methods to histogram-based forecast distributions of GDP growth and inflation in the Euro Area. We find that ensembles perform very similarly to histograms, while being simpler to handle in practice. Given the wide availability of surveys that collect point forecasts but not histograms, these results suggest that ensembles deserve further investigation in economics.     

Structural shocks and dynamic elasticities in a long memory model of the US gasoline retail market

A structural multivariate long memory model of the US gasoline market is employed to disentangle structural shocks and to estimate the own-price elasticity of gasoline demand. Our main empirical findings are: (1) there is strong evidence of nonstationarity and mean reversion in the real price of gasoline and in gasoline consumption; (2) accounting for the degree of persistence present in the data is essential to assess the responses of these two variables to structural shocks; (3) the contributions of the different supply and demand shocks to fluctuations in the gasoline market vary across frequency ranges; and (4) long memory makes available an interesting range of convergent possibilities for gasoline demand elasticities. Our estimates suggest that after a change in prices, consumers undertake a few measures to reduce consumption in the short- and medium-run but are reluctant to implement major changes in their consumption habits.     

Restricted Hodrick–Prescott filtering in a state-space framework

The current paper extends previous results on Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filtering and shows that it is possible to implement the judgement-augmented, or restricted, HP filter within the state-space framework. The implementation entails augmenting the vector of measurements and altering one of the system matrices of the state-space model for the HP filter. Restrictions can thereby be incorporated in the HP filter, making, e.g., estimation more accessible. An application to US GDP gap estimation illustrates how the restricted filter could be usefully applied in an empirical macroeconomic setting.     

The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation

This paper addresses the evolution of cooperation in a multi-agent system with agents interacting heterogeneously with each other based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. The heterogeneity of interaction is defined in two models. First, agents in a network are restricted to interacting with only their neighbors (local interaction). Second, agents are allowed to adopt different IPD strategies against different opponents (discriminative interaction). These two heterogeneous interaction scenarios are different to the classical evolutionary game, in which each agent interacts with every other agent in the population by adopting the same strategy against all opponents. Moreover, agents adapt their risk attitudes while engaging in interactions. Agents with payoffs above (or below) their aspirations will become more risk averse (or risk seeking) in subsequent interactions, wherein risk is defined as the standard deviation of one-move payoffs in the IPD game. In simulation experiments with agents using only own historical payoffs as aspirations (historical comparison), we find that the whole population can achieve a high level of cooperation via the risk attitude adaptation mechanism, in the cases of either local or discriminative interaction models. Meanwhile, when agents use the population’s average payoff as aspirations (social comparison) for adapting risk attitudes, the high level of cooperation can only be sustained in a portion of the population (i.e., partial cooperation). This finding also holds true in both of the heterogeneous scenarios. Considering that payoffs cannot be precisely estimated in a realistic IPD game, simulation experiments are also conducted with a Gaussian disturbance added to the game payoffs. The results reveal that partial cooperation in the population under social comparison is more robust to the variation in payoffs than the global cooperation under historical comparison.