MUTUAL FUND MORTALITY, 12B‐1 FEES,AND THE NET EXPENSE RATIO

The Securities and Exchange Commission is currently reviewing Rule 12b‐1, which governs how fund advisors may pay for the distribution of fund shares. We provide evidence that even after adjusting for economies of scale, funds with 12b‐1 fees have higher expense ratios net of the 12b‐1 fees than do funds without such fees. This finding suggests that 12b‐1 fees are more than just a deadweight cost. We also demonstrate that 12b‐1 fees are highest for funds that ultimately fail, that the proportion of funds with 12b‐1 fees is increasing over time, and that the level of those fees is also increasing over time.     

Das neue Energiewirtschaftsgesetz—Regelungen für einen erweiterten Zielkatalog

Mehr als ein Jahr nach dem EU-rechtlich vorgegebenen Endtermin wurde im Juli 2005 das neue Energiewirtschaftsgesetz verabschiedet. Von welchen Zielen geht dieses Gesetz aus? Wie lauten seine wichtigsten Neuregelungen? Und welche Auswirkungen sind von ihnen zu erwarten?     

Southeast Asian monies and the problem of a common measure,with particular reference to the nineteenth century

From the early seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, the Mexican silver dollar was accepted as a common currency of Southeast Asia, though local governments issued their own dollars based on it. The decline of the value of silver relative to gold after 1870 introduced a gradual shift to official currencies pegged to a gold standard in Europe.     

Markets,torts, and social inefficiency

We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm‐level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability‐related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner who is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, would choose.     

The Investment Portfolio of the Life Insurance Industry in China: Peculiar Constraints and the Specialist Problem

This article describes the particular investment and legal constraints on the life insurance investment portfolio in China (the "Portfolio") and investigates the specialist problem. The "specialist problem" is here defined as an agency problem as in information economics. In September 2004, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission ("CIRC") announced that three of the four largest life insurance companies in China could not meet the mandatory capital adequacy requirement. The author found that although it is harder to manage the Portfolio because of the peculiar constraints, the main characteristic of the poor performance of the Portfolio—failing to meet the capital requirement—is due to the specialist problem, which is mainly due to the controlled economic system. In conclusion, the author suggests specialists and risk management strategies that can be implemented in China with immediate effect, taking into consideration data deficiency and the difficulty of contract enforcement in China.