Negotiation in engineering design

Concurrent design may shorten the duration of a design project, reduce cost, and improve quality of the final design. However, due to the diversified problem-solving knowledge and different goal setting between design agents, it may increase the number of conflicts and make the project more difficult to manage. In this article, a goal-directed negotiation model for resolving conflicts in a cooperative design environment is presented. The proposed model generates negotiation sets, analyzes utilities derived for each design agent, and evaluates them based on three decision rules: maximization of the joint utility, minimization of individual utility differences, and minimization of individual utility differences and maximization of joint utility. A compromise solution is reached iteratively. The approach proposed in this articles is concerned not just with satisfying design constraints, but attempts to maximize system objectives. An example of the poppet relief valve is used to demonstrate the negotiation concept.     

SIMPLE RESOURCE ALLOCATION RULES: A NOTE ON A GENERALISATION

A stream of literature exists on the ability to pick payback hurdles such that use of the payback method replicates decisions based on net present value (NPV) analysis under circumstances where the basic shape of the cash inflow pattern associated with the investment opportunity facing the firm is assumed known. The literature has derived such payback hurdles for specific cash inflow pattern shapes (e.g., level, exponentially increasing/decreasing, arithmetic growth, etc.) The main concern of this note is to identify an expression for a general class of cash inflow pattern shapes (of which the specific shapes in the previous literature are examples) from which can be derived the payback hurdle corresponding to any specific shape belonging to the general class.     

Are aliens green? Assessing foreign establishments' environmental conduct in the United states

Previous research has found that foreign‐owned establishments often lack specific capabilities needed to respond to local business conditions and are held to a higher standard by local stakeholders. These establishments compensate, however, by possessing offsetting capabilities such as technological excellence. In this article, we investigate how these conflicting forces shape the environmental conduct of foreign‐owned facilities. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency, we find that foreign‐owned establishments generate more waste yet manage more waste than U.S.‐owned establishments. We also find evidence that both domestic and foreign‐owned firms generate more waste if they operate multiple facilities across multiple jurisdictions in the United States. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Critical realism and constructivism in strategy research: toward a synthesis

We agree with Kwan and Tsang (2001) that critical realism represents an important point of epistemological departure from mainstream realism, and that it has the potential to inform strategy research. To that end, Kwan and Tsang's argument for a critical realist perspective is valid. There however exist substantial nontrivial differences between constructivism and critical realism. While critical realism contests some of the default assumptions of empiricism and realism which treat social systems as closed systems, it is still predicated upon an inherent order of things that is graspable by research. Constructivism instead focuses on the manner in which researchers constitute theories in the act of describing them. This important distinction makes constructivism far more of a departure from empiricism than critical realism, and therefore it has a different set of implications for strategy research. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Valuation Bias in Commercial Appraisal: A Transaction Price Feedback Experiment

Experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that transaction price feedback may bias valuation judgment. Among participating appraisers, evidence of asymmetrical response was found. The group receiving transaction feedback indicating that current judgments were "too low" responded with judgments in subsequent, unrelated valuations that were significantly higher than the group that received no feedback. The response from "too high" feedback was in the expected direction (lower value judgments) but was not significant. Additionally, valuation dispersion of around 10% revealed in these experiments is consistent with studies of valuation variability and may reflect an upper bound of typical commercial appraisal dispersion.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.