Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE AVERAGE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Four alternative measures of the average duration of unemployment are examined with the intention of illustrating: (1) the biases inherent in the average incomplete duration of unemployment, a statistic that is often the only one reported by many statistical agencies; and (2) the robustness of the average complete duration of unemployment to a host of assumptions underlying its derivation by non-parametric methods. Canadian data are employed, but the results offer a guide to the construction of the average complete duration of unemployment that may have broader applications.     

Does the Delphi process lead to increased accuracy in group-based judgmental forecasts or does it simply induce consensus amongst judgmental forecasters?

We investigate the relative impact of internal Delphi process factors - including panelists' degree of confidence, expertise, majority/minority positioning - and an external factor, richness of feedback - on opinion change and subsequent accuracy of judgmental forecasts. We found that panelists who had low confidence in their judgmental forecast and/or who were in a minority were more likely to change their opinion than those who were more confident and/or in a majority. The addition of rationales, or reasons, to the numeric feedback had little impact upon panelists' final forecasts, despite the quality of panelists' rationales being significantly positively correlated with accurate forecasts and thus of potential use to aid forecast improvement over Delphi rounds. Rather, the effect of rationales was similar to that of confidence: to pull panelists towards the majority opinion regardless of its correctness. We conclude that majority opinion is the strongest influence on panelists' opinion change in both the ‘standard’ Delphi, and Delphi-with-reasons. We make some suggestions for improved variants of the Delphi-with-reasons technique that should help reduce majority influence and thereby permit reasoned arguments to exert their proper pull on opinion change, resulting in forecast accuracy improvements over Delphi rounds.     

Nobelity and novelty: Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s contributions viewed from Vienna

The awarding of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2004 to Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott represents an opportunity to evaluate their contributions in light of Austrian economics. We lay out the basics of their contributions—the general equilibrium approach to economic fluctuations and the game theoretic approach to policy—and argue that they have tenets similar to those of Austrianism. We argue that their methodology parallels Austrian methodology in several significant ways that have gone unnoticed. We conclude that Kydland and Prescott’s Nobel Prize suggests Austrian approaches can have a more prominent impact than they have had in the past.     

The Depreciation of Human Capital Over Time: The Case of Economic Knowledge Revisited

In this note, the authors point out what is learned in principles lasts longer with students of high ability and if the first course is followed by additional courses in economics or mathematics. This lends support to the practice of advising majors not to delay the intermediate theory course after completing principles.