The economics of biotechnology under ecosystem disruption

Economic analysis of chemical pesticide use has shown that the interactions between plants, pests, damage control technology and state of the ecosystem are important variables to be considered. Hence, a bio-economic model was developed for the assessment of Bt variety and pesticide-based control strategies of the cotton-bollworm in China. The model simulates plant growth, the dynamics of pest populations and of natural enemies. The model predictions are used as major inputs for a stochastic micro-level profit model of alternative control strategies.Results show that: (1) productivity effects of Bt varieties and pesticide use depend on the action of natural control agents, and (2) the profitability of damage control measures increases with the severity of ecosystem disruption. The findings highlight the importance of the choice of the counterfactual scenario in the assessment of the impact of agricultural biotechnology. Also, some doubts are raised whether the high benefits of Bt cotton varieties claimed by previous studies based on cross section comparisons are realistic.     

Understanding the framing effect: do affective responses to decision options mediate the influence of frame on choice?

Little research has examined how gain- and loss-framed options influence participants’ affective states. In the current paper, we present two studies that measure affective responses to framed options to identify a potential mediator of the relation between frame and choice. We found that participants reported more positive responses after reading gain-framed options that presented a certain outcome compared to loss-framed options that presented a certain outcome, consistent with the choice patterns of the framing effect. We also found that framing effects were mediated by affective evaluation of the options. We suggest future researchers continue to assess the influence of affective response on evaluating options and making decisions.     

The U.S. left behind? Financial globalization and the rise of IPOs outside the U.S.

From 1990 to 2011, the share of world IPO activity by non-U.S. firms increased because of financial globalization and because of a decrease in U.S. IPO activity. Financial globalization reduces the impact of national institutions on domestic IPO activity and enables more non-U.S. firms from countries with weak institutions to go public with a global IPO. U.S. IPO activity does not benefit from financial globalization. Compared to other countries, the rate of small-firm IPO activity in the U.S. is abnormally low in the 2000s. This abnormally low rate cannot be explained by the regulatory changes of the early 2000s.     

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.     

Filter Tests In Nasdaq Stocks

This study examines the performance of filter and dual moving-average crossover trading rules applied to Nasdaq stocks. We find that trading rules conditioned on a stock's past price history perform poorly, but those based on past movements in the overall Nasdaq Index tend to earn statistically significant abnormal returns. Since there is a high level of transaction costs in this market, these abnormal returns are generally not economically significant. However, there are indications that pursuing some of these strategies can be worthwhile in carefully selected subsets of stocks.     

Universal Banking Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

The Gramm–Leach–Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 repealed many provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act that curtailed competition between banks and commercial firms. Significantly, however, the GLB Act did not repeal the constraint on banks from owning equity in commercial firms (“universal banking”). Should banks be allowed to hold equity in corporate borrowers? If allowed, would banks optimally choose to do so? Despite its relevance from a policy perspective, there are surprisingly few theoretical analyses of this issue of “universal banking”. We develop a model in which the bank's advisory role as an “inside” shareholder hinges on its equity stake. The optimal capital structure and the bank's and entrepreneur's equity stakes are endogenously determined in a world with potential double-sided moral hazard. In certain scenarios, the bank may prefer not to hold any equity. Our analysis indicates that allowing optimal bank equity participation may foster improved corporate performance. This benefit of universal banking should be considered in policy debates.     

The Market Evaluation of Information in Directors' Trades

The purpose of this paper is to examine the propensity, characteristics and performance of directors' trades. Consistent with prior research we show that on average, directors outperform the market. However, we also find that there exist a large number of trades which do not share these abnormal share price returns and consequently have little information content. This has important consequences for market participants who use director trading activity as a signal for their own trading strategies. Using different measures of directors' trades based on trade characteristics, we report that purchases by directors are more informative than sales. In addition, the number of directors trading within a twenty day window and the percentage of the directors' holding that is being traded are both important factors in the abnormal share price performance following the trade.     

Are trading bans effective? Exchange regulation and corporate insider transactions around earnings announcements

There is considerable controversy on the role of corporate insider trading in the financial markets. However, there appears to be a consensus view that some form of regulation concerning their activities should be imposed. One such constraint involves a trading ban in periods when corporate insiders are expected to be advantaged vis-à-vis the information flow. This paper directly tests whether constraints of this kind are effective in curtailing insider activity through a study of the trading characteristics of UK company directors. The London Stock Exchange Model Code (1977) imposes a two-month close period prior to company earnings announcements. We find that although the close period affects the timing of director trades, it is unable to affect their performance or distribution. Directors consistently earn abnormal returns irrespective of the period in which they trade. They tend to buy after abnormally bad earnings news and sell after abnormally good earnings news. Moreover, there are systematic differences in the trading patterns of directors surrounding interim and final earnings announcements. It appears that many corporate insiders have private information and exploit this in their trading activities. As a result, one can conclude that trading bans do not impose significant opportunity costs on the trading of corporate insiders.     

An instantaneous control model of bank reserves and Federal funds management

Empirical evidence indicates that large banks are generally net buyers of Federal funds, while small banks tend to be net sellers. Asymmetric information, bank monopoly power, or risk-aversion arguments have been offered for this phenomenon. However, these models do not address the close link between bank reserves and Federal funds purchases as alternative means of liquidity management. Our stochastic control model focuses on this link and has three main implications: (1) it analyzes interaction between the above-mentioned influences; (2) it identifies three additional reasons for banks' Federal funds activity; and (3) it examines the transmission of monetary policy in a dynamic framework.