A Stackelberg Oligopoly with Nonidentical Firms

This paper extends the Stackelberg model to include any number of nonidentical firms and demonstrates significant counterintuitive results. For example, entry of an additional firm may increase the quantities and/or profits of some existing firms; it may also increase the total industry profit.     

How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value?Recent evidence from East Asia1

The present paper examines the effects of ownership structures on capital structure and firm valuation. It argues that the effects of separation of control from cash flow rights on capital structure and firm value also depend on the separation of control from management as well as on legal rules and enforcement defining investors’ protection. We obtain firm‐level panel data (three stage least squares, 3SLS) estimates from four of the East Asian countries worst affected by the last crisis. There is evidence that the general wisdom that higher control than cash flow rights may lower firm value may be reversed among owner‐managed family firms in the sample countries.     

Segmentation of Rural Labour Contracts: Some Further Evidence

The paper offers an explanation of labour tying commonly observed in seasonally agricultural economies. Employers may either hire regular labourers in the slack season to satisfy all or most of the labour demand in the high season but have underutilised labour in the low–demand season or rely on casual labourers only. Thus farmers hiring regular labour may also hire some casual labour as and when needed to minimise the hoarding costs of regular labour. Secondly, daily regular wages are usually lower than daily casual wages, but regular labourers usually get some wage–advance as well. Thus asset–poor workers have incentives to choose regular labour with interest–free wage advance because they face high marginal costs of credit in the segmented credit markets. The optimum hoarding costs decrease with increase in farm size, but increase with increase in spot market wages. However with improved availability of alternative employment opportunities and/or cheaper credit facilities to the asset–poor labourers, the supply of regular labour is likely to decline. Empirical evidence from the ICRISAT villages in south India seems to be consistent with the primary propositions of the model.     

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firm's managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.     

Task-Based Segmentation of Rural Labour Contracts: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines the theoretical and empirical validity of task-based segmentation of rural labour contracts in seasonal agriculture. Regular labour is hired to perform tasks that are difficult to supervise for which casual labour is not incentive-compatible, and a regular wage above the reservation wage ensures no shirking in these tasks. It is argued that there is a hoarding cost of regular labour which is the cost when productivity is low during the slack season. This implies that minimization of supervision costs necessitates the employment of regular labour in certain tasks, but enhances hoarding cost. Results from the ICRISAT villages in India suggests that daily regular wages are lower than daily casual wages, adjusted by the probability of unemployment. Estimates of a tobit selection model suggest that (a) task characteristics are not significant even among the farms hiring regular labour, (b) larger employment-intensive farms tend to hire more regular labour irrespective of the choice of crop, and (c) there is a significant substitutability between regular and family labour. These results seem to question the very basis of task-based segmentation and strengthen the hoarding cost argument: farms hiring regular labour use it indiscriminately in both non-monitorable and monitorable tasks and, if possible, they may substitute family labour for regular labour with a view to minimizing hoarding cost.     

Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams

We demonstrate the value of "equal pay" policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.     

Are less-favored environments over-invested? The case of rice research in India

Allocation of research resources between favorable and unfavorable rice-growing environments is analyzed in this paper using the case of India. The resource allocation in rice research for all ecosystems of India is approximated by the full-time equivalent (FTE) of scientist time spent in research. This was estimated through a survey of all major public research organizations involved in rice research. The FTEs were adjusted for any cost differences per scientist time across the rice growing environments. Unadjusted FTEs indicated a high congruence in resource allocation while adjusted FTEs showed slight under investment in rainfed environment. The use of equity weights amplified the extent of under investment in rainfed environments. It is concluded that, in the case of rice research, rainfed environments in India remain under-invested moderately. Options for addressing this imbalance and the overall implications for resource allocation are discussed.