Do checks on bureaucrats improve firm value? Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper studies the impact on firm value of tighter checks on bureaucrats’ behaviour. We use as a natural experiment the revision in 2015 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) of its regulations on disciplinary actions. We document a positive and substantial market reaction following this unexpected policy change that tightened and formalised constraints on bureaucrats’ misconduct. The impact is less pronounced for firms with state ownership, firms having CEOs or directors with CPC membership, and firms that operate in provinces with better institutional quality. The subsequent revision in 2018 that enforced political obedience is not associated with a positive market reaction.     

Allocation to Anchor Investors,Underpricing, and the After‐Market Performance of IPOs

We study bidding by anchor investors in a two‐stage initial public offering (IPO) process and document a negative, causal relation between allocation to anchor investors and underpricing. We find that anchor investors are likely to invest in hard‐to‐place offerings characterized by valuation uncertainty. We also document a positive relation between allocation to reputed anchor investors and returns up to lock‐up expiration. Our evidence provides support for information revelation and targeting specific investors’ theories of book building. Anchor‐backed IPOs earn superior returns mainly due to monitoring. Who bids in an IPO seems to matter just as particular types of bids do.     

Evaluating Permanent Disability Ratings Using Empirical Data on Earnings Losses

Workers' compensation systems are typically designed to assign higher permanent disability benefits to workers with more severe disabilities. However, little or no scientific work exists to guide the design of ratings systems to properly account for the amount of earnings power lost due to disability. In this article, we examine the effectiveness of disability ratings using matched administrative data on ratings and earnings for a large, representative sample of permanent disability claimants in California. We find that while workers with higher ratings do experience larger earnings losses on average, there are large and persistent differences in average earnings losses for similarly rated impairments in different parts of the body. We then explore how adjusting permanent disability ratings to reflect cross-impairment differences in earnings losses can affect the equity of permanent disability benefits. Adjusting disability ratings to account for typical earnings losses reduces cross-impairment differences substantially. The adjusted ratings result in a more equitable distribution of disability benefits across workers with different impairments.     

Does Competition Lead to Agglomeration or Dispersion in EMR Vendor Decisions?

We examine hospital Electronic Medical Record (EMR) vendor adoption patterns and how they relate to hospital market structure. As in many network technology adoption decisions, hospitals face countervailing incentives to coordinate or differentiate in their choice of vendors. We find evidence of substantial agglomeration on EMR vendors, which increases as hospital markets become more competitive. These findings suggest that incentives to coordinate dominate incentives to differentiate overall, and the relative balance grows stronger in favor of coordination as markets become more competitive. Our findings also have important implications regarding antitrust policy. A potential downside of hospital consolidation—increased obstacles in information sharing due to vendor differentiation—should be taken into account in evaluation of hospital mergers.     

Complementary or conflictual? Formal participation,informal participation,and organizational performance

Most studies of worker participation examine either formal participatory structures or informal participation. Yet, increasingly, works councils and other formal participatory bodies are operating in parallel with collective bargaining or are filling the void left by its decline. Moreover, these bodies are sprouting in workplaces in which workers have long held a modicum of influence, authority, and production‐ or service‐related information. This study leverages a case from the health care sector to examine the interaction between formal and informal worker participation. Seeking to determine whether or not these two forces—each independently shown to benefit production or service delivery—complement or undermine one another, we find evidence for the latter. In the case of the 27 primary care departments that we study, formal structures appeared to help less‐participatory departments improve their performance. However, these same structures also appeared to impede those departments with previously high levels of informal participation. While we remain cautious with respect to generalizability, the case serves as a warning to those seeking to institute participation in an environment in which some workers have long felt they had the requisite authority, influence, and information necessary to perform their jobs effectively.     

The Cost of Diversity: Endogenous Property Rights and Growth

Well-specified property rightsenhance economic performance but vary considerably across countries.The failure of numerous nation-states to adopt growth-enhancinginstitutions is paradoxical. This paper examines the role ofethnic and linguistic diversity in retarding the developmentof growth-enhancing property rights and in-turn economic growth.The data show that property rights are attenuated in more diversepolities and economic growth is correspondingly lower.