Do financial penalties for environmental violations facilitate improvements in corporate environmental performance? An empirical investigation

Environmental regulations play an essential role in managing firm behavior and providing a reference point for the minimum standards of corporate environmental performance, yet certain firms fail to ensure their environmental performance meets these standards. This research focuses on public firms that the US government has penalized for violating environmental regulations and investigates whether these firms subsequently improved their environmental performance. Surprisingly, neither the receipt of a penalty for an environmental violation nor the imposition of a greater penalty was associated with improvements in environmental performance. Instead, a penalty for environmental violation predicted further, albeit mild, deterioration in environmental performance. While the existing literature has established that financial penalties deter most firms from committing environmental violations, this research contributes to this literature by revealing that these penalties fail to motivate firms that have violated environmental regulations to improve their environmental performance.     

Leseliste Top 5: Personalcontrolling und Personalmanagement

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Agriculture in Europe 2000: An interim report on a cross-national research project

The futures research programme initiated by the European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam, in 1968, under the general title of Plan Europe 2000, consists of four projects : Education, Industrialisation, Urbanisation and Agriculture.¹ Work on the last Agriculture Project commenced in September 1970. The prime aim of the project is to provide alternative “guiding images” of the roles and functions which agriculture could fulfil in Western Europe in the future.²     

Leseliste Top 5: Innovationscontrolling

PRAXIS | Magazin

Leseliste Top 5: Innovationscontrolling     

ATTRACTING SKEPTICAL BUYERS: NEGOTIATING FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS*

Expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property (IP). In principle, confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use. In practice, sellers often waive confidentiality rights. We provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings. Waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation. Buyer skepticism, which reduces participation, arises endogenously from three elements: asymmetric information regarding seller IP, rent dissipation from competition for IP, and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits.     

Professional versus consumer interests in regulation: the case of the US child care industry

Professional licensure benefits producers by creating entry barriers into the profession, but consumers might also gain if licensure induces producers to supply high levels of quality. Whether consumers or producers gain most form licensure can be determined by examining the effect of licensure requirements on aggregate consumption. This paper uses a cross-sectional model to estimate the relationship between variations in state licensure rules and consumption of child care services. The results suggest that professional interests, and not those of consumers, are dominant in the setting of regulatory standards for the US child care industry.