Ex-post Analysis of Mobile Telecom Mergers: The Case of Austria and The Netherlands

Recently there has been an increased attention towards the ex-post evaluation of competition policy enforcement decisions and in particular merger decisions. In this paper we study the effects of two mobile telecommunication mergers on prices. We apply a standard difference-in-differences approach which is widely used in the literature on ex-post evaluation of mergers. For the Austrian T-Mobile/tele.ring merger, we conclude that after the acquisition (for which remedies were imposed) prices in Austria did not increase relative to the considered control countries. For the Dutch T-Mobile/Orange merger, we observe an increase in the mobile tariff prices in the Netherlands in the analysed period, relative to the control countries. We cannot firmly establish whether this price increase was exclusively caused by the T-Mobile/Orange merger or in part by possible price effects brought about by the KPN/Telfort merger consummated two years earlier in the Netherlands. However, we believe that such price increase could be linked to the structural changes brought by both KPN/Telfort and T-Mobile/Orange mergers together.     

Credibility and monetary policy in a model with growth

We examine the implications for monetary policy design of includinglearning-by-doing effects in a macroeconomic model. We showthat an inflation bias arises because monetary surprises maybe exploited to maximise potential output by temporarily raisingthe rate of human capital accumulation. Our model also providesan alternative explanation for the empirical evidence linkinginflation and growth, where the causal link goes from slow growthto high inflation. Unlike traditional credibility models, aninflationary bias can persist even when the authorities do notwish to offset labour market distortions through monetary surpriseswhich undercut the median voter's income.     

Detecting the impact of the “Grain for Green” program on the mean annual vegetation cover in the Shaanxi province, China using SPOT-VGT NDVI data

In order to reduce the soil erosion rate on the Chinese Loess Plateau, the Chinese government launched in 1999 the “Grain for Green” program (GfG). The objective of this program was to increase the forest cover on steep slopes in the landscape by planting trees and sowing grasses on former cropland. The program was a massive investment by the Chinese government. By the end of 2005 the GfG-program was implemented in an area of 87,000 km² in which about 400–600 million trees were planted. At present it is not known to what extent this program was successful. This paper examines the effects of the GfG-program on the mean annual vegetation cover in the Shaanxi province. A decadal time series of SPOT VEGETATION imagery from 1998 till 2005 were used to calculate NDVI-values in four counties with different rainfall regimes. By means of a regression between preceding rainfall and NDVI-values the effects of rainfall variability were filtered out. A trend analysis of the corrected NDVI time series pointed out that the GfG-program resulted in a significant increase of the vegetation cover on farmland in the northern part of Shaanxi province. In the southern part of the province, which has a more humid climate and large areas of irrigation farmland no significant increase of the vegetation cover on farmland could be detected.     

The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting

Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale. An expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal, allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining (undisclosed) know-how. We examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size.     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

Macroeconomic shocks, structural change and real exchange rates: Evidence from historical data

We present empirical evidence on the forces driving real exchange rates in the long-run. Using data from the US, UK and Italy across different exchange rate regimes, we find support for the hypothesis that productivity and fiscal shocks matter. However, in some cases fiscal shocks cause depreciations, likely triggered by the monetary accommodation of fiscal shocks. We also find that the traditional Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect of productivity on real exchange rates is reversed in some cases, which confirms the importance of the distributive sector in driving productivity gains.     

Is fixed-mobile substitution strong enough to de-regulate fixed voice telephony? Evidence from the Austrian markets

In this paper, we estimate own-price elasticities for fixed network voice telephony access and national calls services for private users as well as cross-price elasticities to mobile services using time series data from 2002 to 2007 from the Austrian markets. Using instrumental variable estimates and considering cointegration, we find that access is inelastic while calls are elastic. We conclude that the retail market for national calls of private users can probably be deregulated due to sufficient competitive pressure from mobile. Access-substitution on the other hand does not seem to be strong enough to justify de-regulation.     

History of Thought as Ceremonial Genealogy: The Neglected Influence of Herbert Spencer on Thorstein Veblen

Large corporations are invariably structured as formal institutions, and this formality is reflected in organizational charts. These charts depict a multilevel managerial hierarchy of authority within the organization typified, in the simplest case, by a pyramid. Many economic and business researchers attribute formality to a desire for greater efficiency, although I do not take this position in the present paper. Instead, I agree with researchers who connect formality with organizational legitimacy. I further argue that personal interests are at work in bigness and formalization. Top managers are motivated by desire for power and prestige. Formality furthers these objectives by rigidly fixing relations and ranks within the organization. Widespread belief in efficiency and legitimacy converge with personal motives to encourage and entrench formality. Corporate size and structure are seen as having deleterious effects on employees and society at large. But they also have some negative impacts on those at the top.     

New Keynesian dynamics in a low interest rate environment

Recent research has found that the dynamic properties of the New Keynesian model are unorthodox when the nominal interest rate is zero. Improvements in technology and reductions in the labor tax rate lower economic activity and the size of the government purchase output multiplier is very large. This paper provides evidence that these results are not empirically relevant. We show that a prototypical New Keynesian model fit to Japanese data exhibits orthodox dynamics during Japan's episode with zero interest rates. We then demonstrate that this specification is more consistent with outcomes in Japan than alternative specifications that have unorthodox properties.