Accounting comparability and relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation

We investigate whether accounting comparability is associated with the likelihood that CEO compensation is tied to relative accounting performance (e.g., return on assets). We predict that higher accounting comparability increases the risk-sharing benefit of accounting-based RPE because peer firm performance better controls for common risk in RPE firm performance. Thus, firms that have higher accounting comparability with potential performance peers will be more likely to include accounting-based RPE as a component of the total CEO compensation contract. We find support for this prediction using (1) an explicit test design that relies on the ex ante terms of CEO compensation contracts obtained from proxy disclosures, and (2) an implicit design that relies on the actual realizations of CEO compensation. To provide further evidence, we examine the association between accounting comparability and the selection of performance peers when the CEO compensation contract includes an accounting-based RPE component. We find that higher comparability between the RPE firm and a potential peer firm increases (decreases) the potential peer firm’s likelihood of being selected into (dropped from) the peer group. Cross-sectional analyses show that this association is less pronounced, or not present, when the relative performance measure is price-based (as opposed to accounting-based), indicating that these results do not merely reflect a more general role of comparability in all RPE contracts.     

Opportunities and pitfalls for researchers to contribute to the design of evidence-based agricultural policies: lessons from Uganda

Agricultural policies in sub-Saharan Africa have paid insufficient attention to sustainable intensification. In Uganda, agricultural productivity has stagnated with aggregate increases in crop production being attributed to expansion of cultivated land area. To enhance sustainable crop intensification, the Ugandan Government collaborated with stakeholders to develop agricultural policies using an evidence-based approach. Previously, evidence-based decision-making tended to focus on the evidence base rather than evidence and its interactions within the broader policy context. We identify opportunities and pitfalls to strengthen science engagement in agricultural policy design by analysing the types of evidence required, and how it was shared and used during policy development. Qualitative tools captured stakeholders' perspectives of agricultural policies and their status in the policy cycle. Subsequent multi-level studies identified crop growth constraints and quantified yield gaps which were used to compute the economic analyses of policy options that subsequently contributed to sub-national program planning. The study identified a need to generate relevant evidence within a short time 'window' to influence policy design, power influence by different stakeholders and quality of stakeholder interaction. Opportunities for evidence integration surfaced at random phases of policy development due to researchers’ ’embededness’ within co-management and coordination structures.     

Business strategy and firm location decisions: testing traditional and modern methods

Business Economics - For nearly a century, economists have relied upon the neoclassical principle of a “profit-maximizing firm.” Two modern challenges to this principle have arisen: the...     

Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.     

Offshoring and the Elasticity of Labour Demand

This paper examines the impact of offshoring on labour demand and labour demand elasticities for a sample of 40 countries over the period 1995–2009 using the World Input–output Database (WIOD). Estimating the conditional labour demand model we find that offshoring impacts negatively labour demand, and in particular the demand for low- and medium-educated labour, with some evidence indicating that offshoring has tended to increase labour demand elasticities. Of particular interest are results for the subsamples of developed and developing countries. Most notably, we find that the negative effects of offshoring in developed countries are largest for high-educated labour, an outcome which we show is due to the offshoring of developed countries with other developed countries.     

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

Extracting Nonlinear Signals from Several Economic Indicators

We develop a twofold analysis of how the information provided by several economic indicators can be used in Markov switching dynamic factor models to identify the business cycle turning points. First, we compare the performance of a fully nonlinear multivariate specification (one‐step approach) with the ‘shortcut’ of using a linear factor model to obtain a coincident indicator, which is then used to compute the Markov switching probabilities (two‐step approach). Second, we examine the role of increasing the number of indicators. Our results suggest that one step is generally preferred to two steps, especially in the vicinity of turning points, although its gains diminish as the quality of the indicators increases. Additionally, we also obtain decreasing returns of adding more indicators with similar signal‐to‐noise ratios. Using the four constituent series of the Stock–Watson coincident index, we illustrate these results for US data. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An Introduction to the Issue of Consumer Law in South America

Journal of Consumer Policy - This Special Issue has a long history. It goes back to a conference in July 2017 organized by Cláudia Lima Marques in Porto Alegre Brazil, the first of the Center...