Barriers to use of policy-relevant information by decision makers

This paper identifies the major barriers which hinder or prevent the application of policy-relevant information, derived from analytical techniques, to practical decisions by actual decision makers. The focus of the report is on Technology Assessment (TA), as an analytical technique which has not yet received the level of utilization which its practitioners have hoped for. However, TA borrows from the older analytic disciplines of technological forecasting and systems analysis, and is related to others such as cost-benefit analysis. Because of the similarities with these other disciplines, many of the barriers which hinder the application of these older techniques also act as barriers to the greater     

Nursing career fulfillment: statistics and statements from registered nurses

A state-level survey of registered nurses confirmed national findings and raised new issues. Findings revealed that while nurses love the intrinsic reward of nursing, they report workplace, relationship, and stress issues which contribute to frustration and exhaustion. These issues may prevent registered nurses from giving the nursing care they desire to deliver, hastening preventable retirement and costly turnover decisions.     

Is there an energy paradox in fuel economy? A note on the role of consumer heterogeneity and sorting bias

From the previous literature, it can be found that consumers tend to undervalue discounted future energy costs in their purchase decisions for energy-using durables. We show that this finding could, in part, result from ignoring consumer heterogeneity in empirical analyses as opposed to true undervaluation.     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

The Effect of Internal Barriers on the Connection Between Stakeholder Integration and Proactive Environmental Strategies

This paper examines the influence of internal barriers on the relationship between the organizational capability of stakeholder integration and proactive environmental strategies. We adopt a moderate hierarchical regression model to test the hypotheses using data from a sample of 73 managers in the business education industry. The paper contributes to stakeholder theory by showing that stakeholder integration positively influences the development of proactive environmental strategies when managers perceive internal barriers to the development of such strategies. This article also explores an ethical dilemma—managers may use the stakeholder integration capability to support their own interests rather than to benefit stakeholders.     

Short-term wholesale funding and systemic risk: A global CoVaR approach

We use the CoVaR approach to identify the main factors behind systemic risk in a set of large international banks. We find that short-term wholesale funding is a key determinant in triggering systemic risk episodes. In contrast, we find weaker evidence that either size or leverage contributes to systemic risk within the class of large international banks. We also show that asymmetries based on the sign of bank returns play an important role in capturing the sensitivity of system-wide risk to individual bank returns. Since short-term wholesale funding emerges as the most relevant systemic factor, our results support the Basel Committee’s proposal to introduce a net stable funding ratio, penalizing excessive exposure to liquidity risk.     

Venture-backed Private Equity Valuation and Financial Statement Information

The relationship between (a) private and public equity market valuations and (b) financial statement information is examined for a sample of 502 venture capital backed companies from six different industries over the 1993–2003 period. Financial statement information explains a sizable component of the levels of and changes in valuation in both the Pre-IPO and Post-IPO periods. The findings support prior research for Post-IPO companies that revenues are value enhancing and costs are value diminishing. For the Pre-IPO period, we find that cost of sales; sales, marketing, general and administrative; and research and development are value enhancing—even when revenues are included in the analysis. This is consistent with costs incurred by early-stage, venture-backed companies having a strong “investment aspect” as the companies build a platform/infrastructure to grow revenue and validate their business model(s). We document the growth of early stage companies for revenues and costs in both calendar time (by round of private equity financing) and event time (relative to their eventual IPO).

Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.