Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

Factor decomposition of cross-country income inequality, 1960–1990

In this paper we present Esteban's 1994 [Esteban, J., 1994. La desigualdad interregional en Europa y en España: descripción y análisis. In: Esteban, J.M^a., Vives, X. (dirs.), Crecimiento y convergencia regional en España y en Europa, Vol. 2, Instituto de Análisis Económico] decomposition of the Theil index of inequality over per capita incomes into the (unweighted) sum of the inequality indices of (i) the productivity per employed worker, (ii) the employment rate, (iii) the active over working-age population rate, and (iv) the working-age over total population rate. Each of these factors clearly have different meanings for analysis as well as for policy. We apply this factoral decomposition to a set of 120 countries. We also contrast the empirical findings with the results obtained for the 23 OECD countries. [OECD, Labour Force Statistics, Several issues, Paris].     

Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers

In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two ex-ante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independent private valuations. I find the ex-ante utilitarian-optimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as “numeraire” to purchase probability units of the other object. I characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries, auctions and insurance. The latter element ensures that efficient auctions are feasible. If the problem is constrained to guarantee exactly one object per agent, then the optimal mechanism uses no information other than the agents? ordinal preferences.