Vouchers and caseworkers in training programs for the unemployed

This paper studies the role of vouchers and caseworkers in training programs for the unemployed. We explore the unique features of the Hartz reform in Germany which simultaneously introduced training vouchers and imposed more selective criteria on participants. This allows us to go beyond the standard approach when we estimate the treatment effects for the most important type of training. Next to assessing the overall impact of the reform on the training’s effectiveness, we isolate the impact induced by changes in the composition of program participants (selection effect) from the impact based on the introduction of vouchers and related institutional changes (institutional effect). Our results show a small positive overall impact of the reform. The decomposition suggests that the selection effect is, if at all, slightly negative, and that the introduction of the voucher and related institutional changes increased both employment and earnings of participants. It furthermore appears that our findings are driven by skilled participants.     

Pricing options with Green's functions when volatility,interest rate and barriers depend on time

We derive the Green's function for the Black–Scholes partial differential equation with time-varying coefficients and time-dependent boundary conditions. We provide a thorough discussion of its implementation within a pricing algorithm that also accommodates American style options. Greeks can be computed as derivatives of the Green's function. Generic handling of arbitrary time-dependent boundary conditions suggests our approach to be used with the pricing of (American) barrier options, although options without barriers can be priced equally well. Numerical results indicate that knowledge of the structure of the Green's function together with the well-developed tools of numerical integration make our approach fast and numerically stable.     

EZB-Schuldverschreibungen — neue Verwendung für ein altes Instrument?

Wirtschaftsdienst - Als Reaktion auf die Corona-Krise haben die Notenbanken des Eurosystems ihre Anleihekäufe im Rahmen des APP-Programms weiter aufgestockt und um das PEPP-Programm erweitert....     

On the economics of the longevity risk transfer market

We present a model of a longevity risk transfer market with different market players (primary insurers, reinsurers, and capital market investors) and investigate how market dynamics and the market players' roles evolve with progressing market saturation. We find that reinsurers' appetite for longevity risk is the key driver in the early stage of market development. Since diversification benefits with other businesses decrease with every transaction, the reinsurance market is intrinsically antimonopolistic. With the increasing saturation of the reinsurance sector as a whole, its competitiveness shrinks leading to rising expected risk-adjusted returns for capital market investors. We show that in a saturated market, reinsurers should assume the entire longevity risk from primary insurers, diversify it within their business mix, and subsequently pass on only specific (nondiversifiable) components of the longevity risk to the capital markets. Our findings provide valuable suggestions on how to make the best use of the market's limited risk absorption capacity.