Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.     

Monetary policy in the transition to a market economy: The case of Hungary

In the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, monetary policy played a subordinate role, there were no capital-market institutions and the banking system was single-tier. All this has to be changed in the transition to a market economy. The example of Hungary, which abolished the traditional system of central planning as early as 1968, shows some of the pitfalls to be avoided.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.     

Countries and their products: A cognitive structure perspective

This research reports on consumers’ cognitive structures for countries and their products. In-depth personal interviews identified respondents’ knowledge, beliefs, myths, and other relevant cognitions related to a diverse set of 11 countries and their products. Derived cognitive dimensions were analyzed via correspondence analysis, and the 11 countries were subsequently grouped into five sets, or cognitive categories. In addition to the empirical findings, the article introduces the concept of country equity as a new way of thinking about global brands and discusses managerial implications related thereto. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, and elsewhere. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of International Business Studies, California Management Review, and others. He is the coauthor of two marketing research textbooks and has published in leading marketing and social psychological journals.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.     

An Analysis of Differences in Earnings Between Small and Large Commercial Banks

This paper introduces a simple, yet rich, measure of efficiency changes based on the revenue-generating-ability (RGA) principle. Using this principle, we explain the connections between efficiency changes and the variables, such as pretax profits, interest expense, non-interest expense, profit margins, loan loss provision, and asset quality. These connections are used to explain earnings differences between small and large commercial banks.     

Duration and the price behavior of fixed-rate level payment mortgages: An analytical investigation

In this research we use a continuous payment formula for duration to examine the price behavior of a fixed-rate level payment mortgage. In the case where the mortgage is held to maturity, duration increases monotonically as term-to-maturity increases, regardless of changes in the market rate of interest. In the case where the mortgage is prepaid prior to maturity, there exists a unique market interest rate below which duration is a monotonically increasing function of time of prepayment, but above which duration has a global maximum at some time of prepayment prior to the term-to-maturity.