The Allocation of German Aid: Self‐interest and Government Ideology

We investigate the importance of geo‐strategic and commercial motives for the allocation of German aid to 138 countries over the 1973–2010 period. We find that geo‐strategic and commercial motives matter. When we relate them to the political color of the German government in general, and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Federal Foreign Office in particular, we find their importance to be at least as strong under the socialist leadership. Socialist leadership decreases the amount of aid commitments, controlled for other factors.     

Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the Degree of Official Financing Matter?

Using a new data set for 41 German non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), we analyse the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries in a Tobit regression framework. By identifying for each NGO the degree of official financing, we address the largely unresolved issue of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that German NGOs are more active in poorer countries, while they do not complement official aid by working under difficult local conditions. Beyond a certain threshold, rising financial dependence weakens their poverty orientation and provides an incentive to engage in ‘easier’ environments. In addition, we find that the NGOs follow the state as well as NGO peers when allocating aid. This herding behaviour is, however, hardly affected by the degree of official financing.     

Aid Delivery through Non‐governmental Organisations: Does the Aid Channel Matter for the Targeting of Swedish Aid?

This paper analyses whether aid channelled through non‐governmental organisations (NGOs) is less affected by selfish donor motivations and better targeted to needy recipient countries than aid distributed by state agencies. We employ Tobit (and Probit) models and make use of an exceptionally detailed database that allows an assessment of the allocation of Swedish aid channelled through NGOs in comparison to the allocation of Swedish official aid. Our analysis provides mixed results. On the one hand, NGOs appear to be altruistic as far as available indicators on political and commercial motivations of aid can tell. On the other hand, needs‐based targeting of aid by NGOs turns out to be surprisingly weak. GDP per capita of recipient countries shapes the allocation of official aid, but not that of aid channelled through NGOs. The headcount of absolute poverty has a significantly positive effect on aid allocation, but its impact is not particularly strong when NGOs are involved. Overall, the Swedish case supports the sceptical view that NGOs are not necessarily superior donors compared to state aid agencies.     

Product innovation in banking: How marketing works

Many benchmarking initiatives are driven by an academic or government desire to understand the position of industry sectors relative to each other or to those of other nations. In contrast, for managers striving to compete and drive their businesses forward, this generalised approach is secondary to their need for tools which are applicable in their own company and which give them direct benefits.

Observing that benchmarking has proved very powerful in manufacturing, the Chartered Institute of Marketing (CIM) invested in research to establish a similar approach in marketing. Benchmarking was defined as a system which incorporates three essential elements: measurement, processes, and a defined, measured, aspirational 'benchmark'.

This paper describes a unique benchmarking tool designed specifically for marketing processes (CIMBA), developed by the CIM. It enables both marketers and senior executives in non-marketing functions to identify the role of marketing in their organisation and to measure the processes which convert marketing strategy into reality.

The system is driven by a model of best practice, tailored to each organisation's situation through their particular critical success factors. Analysis is software-based to provide easy manipulations of the data. CIMBA provides the measurements and the means to broker partnerships between carefully matched companies, even across sectors, if they have gone through a CIMBA assessment.     

Towards new agreements on international trade liberalization

Zusammenfassung Zu neuen Abkommen über Liberalisierung des internationalen Handels. — Die Vielfalt der nichttarif?ren Handelshemmnisse steht ihrem allgemeinen und linearen Abbau—analog den Zollverhandlungen der Kennedy-Runde — bislang entgegen. In der vorliegenden Studie wird daher vorgeschlagen, für jedes Land einen ?Zolltarif der nichttarif?ren Handelshemmnisse? zu berechnen, indem auβertarif?re Maβnahmen in Form von Zoll?quivalenten quantifiziert werden. Dabei ist die zentrale Hypothese, daβ jedes Handelshemmnis die Differenz zwischen heimischen Erzeugerpreisen und Importpreisen vergr?βert; diese Differenz—gemessen in vom Hundert des Importpreises—ist das Zoll?quivalent. Die Methode der Quantifizierung sollte je nach Art der statistischen Daten gew?hlt werden. Drei M?glichkeiten werden vorgeführt, und zwar für homogene Produkte ein direkter Preisvergleich am Beispiel des Steinkohlebergbaus, für heterogene Produkte ein Elastizit?tsansatz am Beispiel der feinkeramischen Industrie und ein Vergleich von Warenk?rben am Beispiel der Textilindustrie. Abschlieβend werden m?gliche Divergenzen zwischen Protektionswirkungen und Protektionsabsichten untersucht.

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Resumen Hacia un nuevo acuerdo sobre la liberalizatión del comercio international. —La diversidad de barreras no arancelarias existente se ha mostrado como obstáculo a una desarme general y lineal análogo a las reducciones arancelarias en la ronda Kennedy. En el presente trabajo los autores proponen el establecimiento, en cada pais, de un ?arancel aduanero de las trabas no arancelarias? que se obtiene mediante la calculación de equivalentes arancelarios de aquellas trabas. La premisa central es que cualquier barrera a la importatión aumenta la diferencia entre los precios industriales domésticos y los de importación; esta diferencia, expresada como porcentaje del precio de importación, corresponde al equivalente arancelario. El método de cuantificación a aplicar deberá regirse por los datos estadfsticos disponibles. Los autores presentan très posibilidades, a saber: para productos homogéneos una comparación de precios directa, tomándose como ejemplo la industria extractiva del carbón, para productos heterogéneos un concepto de elasticidad, sirviendo de ejemplo la industria de la cerámica, y una comparación de la cesta de productos, utilizándose como ejemplo la industria textil. Finalmente los autores analizan posibles divergencias entre los efectos y las intenciones de medidas proteccionistas.

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Résumé Vers de nouveaux accords sur la libéralisation du commerce international. —La diversité des barrières non-tarifaires au commerce a jusqu’ à présent empêché leur réduction universelle et linéaire—conformément aux réductions tarifaires du ?Kennedy Round?. Dans l’article que voici on propose donc de calculer pour chaque pays un tarif douanier des barrières non-tarifaires en quantifiant les mesures non-tarifaires sous forme d’équivalents de tarifs. L’hypothèse qui en sert de base soutient que chaque barrière au commerce international augmente la différence entre les prix du marché national et ceux du marché mondial; cette différence — exprimée en pourcentages des prix d’importation—représente l’équivalent du tarif douanier. La méthode de quantification doit être adaptée aux données statistiques qu’on possède. Trois possibilités sont discutées en détail: pour les produits homogènes, la comparaison directe démontrée à l’exemple de l’industrie minière du charbon; pour les produits hétérogènes, un calcul d’élasticité demontre à l’exemple de l’industrie de poterie, et la comparaison de paniers de marchandises démontrée à l’exemple de l’industrie textile. Finalement, sont examinées les divergences possibles entre les effets du protectiónnisme et l’intention protectionniste.

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Riassunto Di nuovi accordi sulla liberalizzazione del commercio internazionale. —La molteplicit à degli ostacoli commerciali non tariffari sta finora in opposizione —analogamente aile trattative doganali del Kennedy-Runde—alla sua generale e lineare demolizione. Nel presente studio viene perció proposto di calcolare per ogni Paese una ?tariffa doganale degli ostacoli commerciali non tariffari?, mentre provvedimenti extratariffari sono quantificati in forma di equivalenze doganali. Inoltre l’ipotesi centrale è che ogni ostacolo commerciale ingrandisce la differenza tra prezzi di prodotti nazionali e prezzi d’importazione; questa differenza—misurata in per cento del prezzo d’importazione—è l’equivalenza doganale. Il metodo delia quantificazione dovrebbe essere scelto a seconda del genère dei dati statistici. Tre possibilit à sono presentate, e cioè per prodotti omogenei un diretto confronto dei prezzi sull’esempio dell’industria mineraria del carbone, per prodotti eterogenei un’impiego di elasticit à sull’esempio dell’industria di cerámica fine e un confronto di canestri di merci sull’esempio dell’industria tessile. In ultimo sono analizzate possibili divergenze tra effetti di protezione e intenzioni di protezione.

     

A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the German Retirement Insurance System

This study evaluates the positive and negative features of the German public pension system and discusses three reasons for its increasing perceived and real difficulties: maturation, negative incentive effects, and the problems of demographic change. The German system in its current form may be able to limp through the coming decades but will cease to be the exemplary Bismarckian machine that has created generous retirement incomes at reasonable tax rates. Current policy proposals are insufficient and a few but incisive design changes and some degree of prefunding could rescue the many positive aspects of the German retirement insurance system.     

How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?

This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy, and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The analytics also show that the shadow economy and corruption are substitutes. The predictions of the model are empirically tested and confirmed.