Strommarktdesign: Zur Ausgestaltung der Auktionsregeln an der EEX

This paper studies the design of power exchanges in liberalized electricty markets. We analyze several pricing rules for day ahead trading and show that a uniform price mechanism has quite desirable properties as compared to its alternatives. We then discuss how the particular cost structure of electricity generation can be accounted for by appropriate bid formats. We moreover analyze the effects of bid caps and price floors in electricity auctions on market performance, as well as several other aspects of electricity market design. In particular, we discuss linkage of independently operating markets for electricity, reserve energy and transmission capacities, coupling of national power exchanges, and the effects of transparency on the outcome of electricity markets.     

Ein Vergleich ausgewählter europäischer Strombörsen

We study the rules of selected european energy exchanges and compare their institutional design. In most countries (except for the UK) a uniform price mechanism is used. The rules differ, however, in the possibilities to express complementary cost components in the bids. Also the degree of international coupling of markets is very different across countries. Our comparison of the markets allows to identify attractive trading rules and yields insights on an effective electricity market design.     

Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania

After the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favourable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop as perhaps expected. This article explores the factors that determine the formation of the intention of Romanian vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so called producer groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, which we model with a structural equation model. We identified as main intention drivers the expectation for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor. The level of distrust is high. Although our trust variable is not significant as a predictor of the intention to cooperate in the model, we find qualitative indications that trust plays a role when the intention is translated into actual behaviour.     

How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?

This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy, and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The analytics also show that the shadow economy and corruption are substitutes. The predictions of the model are empirically tested and confirmed.     

Cross hedging under multiplicative basis risk

Cross hedging price risk in an incomplete financial market creates basis risk. We propose a new way of modeling basis risk where price risk and basis risk are combined in a multiplicative way. Under this specification, positive prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for underhedging in an unbiased market. Using the example of cross hedging jet fuel price risk with crude oil futures, we show that the new specification is superior in describing the price series and that optimal cross hedges differ significantly from those derived under the traditional additive cross hedging model.     

Experimental research method in a management accounting context

In management accounting the experimental method has been under-utilised compared to other disciplines such as auditing. This paper examines considerations necessary in experimental design to ensure both internal validity and experimental realism with the aim to increase utilisation of this methodology in management accounting. Task design, experimental design, experimental procedures and post-test questionnaire design are addressed specifically as they form the basic building blocks of most experiments. This paper also examines 'lessons' learned both in the design and administration of the experiment to help researchers in the use of the experimental method. Potential changes to the experiment are discussed, as part of an opportunity to improve future research work using the existing or a similar experiment     

Design von Informationsfeedback in Regelenergiemärkten

Information feedback is a much debated issue on balancing power markets: which information on past auctions should be published and when? The article analyzes advantages and disadvantages of different feedback policies applied to the example of the Swiss balancing power market. Our main conclusion is that the publication of the marginal bid is usually recommendable. This is often not the case for additional information (e.g. extramarginal bids). However, the answer depends on the specific market design and the market structure.     

Balancing Power Markets in Germany: Timing Matters

This paper analyzes timing issues on the German balancing power market. We focus the analysis on the length of the bidding period, i.e. the length of the time period a supplier has to provide balancing power capacities, and the question of how far before the beginning of a bidding period the auction should be carried out. We show that different load levels require different plants for the optimal provision of balancing power. In a longer bidding period, the power plants that have the lowest average cost in the bidding period are unlikely to be efficient in all hours of the bidding period. Hence, shortening bidding periods can increase efficiency. Furthermore, we show that an early commitment on a power plant’s mode of operation (when uncertainty about resulting spot prices is still relatively high) also reduces efficiency. This suggests that the auction should be held relatively close to the beginning of the bidding period. Furthermore, we discuss some advantages of a liquid real time market.