Political scrutiny and earnings management in the oil refining industry

The fortunes of the oil refining industry have historically been tied to the political process. In periods of high gasoline prices public outcry increases pressure on the political process to increase regulation, taxation, and other costs on the industry. This study explores the relationship of gasoline prices and oil firm earning with accounting earnings management of oil firms. Findings indicate that firms make accounting changes and discretionary accruals to decrease (increase) earnings in periods when gasoline prices and oil firm earnings are rising (falling).     

Cointegration Vector Estimation by Panel DOLS and Long‐run Money Demand*

We study the panel dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) estimator of a homogeneous cointegration vector for a balanced panel of N individuals observed over T time periods. Allowable heterogeneity across individuals include individual‐specific time trends, individual‐specific fixed effects and time‐specific effects. The estimator is fully parametric, computationally convenient, and more precise than the single equation estimator. For fixed N as T→∞, the estimator converges to a function of Brownian motions and the Wald statistic for testing a set of s linear constraints has a limiting χ²(s) distribution. The estimator also has a Gaussian sequential limit distribution that is obtained first by letting T→∞ and then letting N→∞. In a series of Monte‐Carlo experiments, we find that the asymptotic distribution theory provides a reasonably close approximation to the exact finite sample distribution. We use panel DOLS to estimate coefficients of the long‐run money demand function from a panel of 19 countries with annual observations that span from 1957 to 1996. The estimated income elasticity is 1.08 (asymptotic s.e. = 0.26) and the estimated interest rate semi‐elasticity is ?0.02 (asymptotic s.e. = 0.01).     

An Analysis of Differences in Earnings Between Small and Large Commercial Banks

This paper introduces a simple, yet rich, measure of efficiency changes based on the revenue-generating-ability (RGA) principle. Using this principle, we explain the connections between efficiency changes and the variables, such as pretax profits, interest expense, non-interest expense, profit margins, loan loss provision, and asset quality. These connections are used to explain earnings differences between small and large commercial banks.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings information: an intraday analysis

For a sample of NYSE firms, we show that wide spreads are accompaniedby low depths, and that spreads widen and depths fall in responseto bigger volume. Spreads widen and depths fall in anticipationof earnings announcements; these effects are more pronouncedfor announcements with larger subsequent price changes. Spreadsare also wider following earnings announcements, but this effectdissipates quickly after controlling for volume. Collectively,our results suggest liquidity providers are sensitive to changesin information asymmetry risk and use both spreads and depthsto actively manage this risk.     

Innovative productivity and returns to scale in the pharmaceutical industry

This study shows that firms in the pharmaceutical industry experience decreasing returns to scale in R & D as the level of R & D expenditures rises. The paper presents the results of our study of the innovative output of 16 pharmaceutical firms over a 19 year period. Given the strong correlation between R & D budgets and firm size, our study suggests the wave of mergers in the industry may yield less innovative productivity than managers expect.     

Are differences in firm size transitory or permanent?

An Erratum for this article has been published in Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(2) 2003, 249 Previous empirical work on corporate growth rates using cross‐section or short‐panel econometric techniques suggests that growth rates are random but that some degree of mean reversion exists. This means that size differences between firms are transitory. Another, more natural way to explore the long‐run distribution of firm sizes is to examine data on the growth of particular firms over long periods of time. Using a sample of 147 UK firms observed continually for more than 30 years, our conclusions are that growth rates are highly variable over time and that differences in growth rates between firms do not persist for very long. Further, firms show no tendency to converge to either a common size or to a pattern of stable size differences over time. These results are compared and contrasted with standard approaches that suggest that firms reach and maintain stable positions in a skewed size distribution. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs

In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.