Pro-poor microcredit in South Africa: cost-efficiency and productivity of South African pro-poor microfinance institutions

This article compares the performance of selected South African microcredit non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have a poverty-alleviation focus against various benchmarks drawn from the MicroBanking Bulletin. Donors, governments and many analysts regard sustainability as the benchmark of microfinance institutions' (MFIs) performance. However, the most relevant question is whether microcredit NGOs are doing as well as they can in their context. Of particular contextual importance is income inequality in a society. South Africa has the world's second worst income inequality, after neighbouring Botswana. This creates a situation in which microcredit NGOs must recover ‘First World’ costs, particularly salaries, from revenues based on clients who can only afford loans on a par with Third World countries. Compounding this situation are structural obstacles to microenterprise in South Africa, as well as obstacles to productivity in microcredit NGOs. Taken together, this creates a ‘salary burden’ for South African microcredit NGOs, which is the highest in the world according to relevant benchmarks. South African MFI managers face significant obstacles to improving productivity to compensate for the divergence between staff and client living levels. These include an inadequate skills base, the small scale of the market, rapid labour turnover, and limited resources for capacity development. South African MFIs face the options of moving upmarket (which many have done), adopting methodological innovation or new product development, or closure. Of these, there is a strong argument to be made for supported savings and credit approaches as an alternative to NGO-based microcredit. Such an approach has the advantages of greater voluntary input and social capital formation.     

Complexity in the telecommunications industry: When integrating infrastructure and services backfires

The emergence of pure Internet-based service providers has put many integrated telecommunications firms - industry incumbents that provide services on their own infrastructure - under massive pressure. While various pure service providers enjoy high performance, the products offered by the incumbents often cannot compete on either price or user experience. Conventional wisdom, however, might suggest the opposite: that coordinating both infrastructure and services might allow the incumbents to reap synergy effects and create superior products. To address this issue, this paper applies a complex systems perspective to the telecommunications industry. It conceptualizes telecommunications firms to be searching for good configurations of interdependent service and infrastructure activities that need to fit together to achieve high-performing product systems. Using a simulation model, the paper shows that integrated operators can indeed take advantage of the interdependencies between the infrastructure and the service domain, resulting in superior product performance. Integrating infrastructure and services, however, can backfire: because learning about both domains and their interdependence requires more time, performance in the short run will be lower than that of pure service providers that can focus on adapting their service-related activities to an infrastructure that is beyond their control. The paper characterizes the conditions under which these effects can arise and concludes with implications for management and policy.     

Getting Cinderella to the ball: putting education at the heart of financial education

The recent banking collapse has called into question all activity related to financial services, from regulation to consumer protection, to financial education. Since the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development's 2005 ‘Recommendations on Principles and Good Practices for Financial Education and Awareness’, there has been an increase in financial education activity, yet the world is a different place. The role of financial education, its scope and its potential, must now be critically analysed to help ensure its efficacy in supporting financial rectitude in challenging times. The authors draw on several years’ experience in the design and delivery of financial education programmes and debt prevention interventions, informed by their perspective as educationalists. In this theoretical commentary, they seek to influence the discourse on financial education, and position education as a foundational discipline in financial education. The authors identify potential risk to the future of financial education, engaging with the literature that questions the validity of financial education as an endeavour in consumer protection, which points to the dearth of empirical evidence to support its effectiveness, and which queries the efficacy of resourcing such initiative development. They argue that financial education focused on consumption cannot serve the citizen; rather, financial education must be rooted in the needs of the individual. Through these analyses, the authors highlight areas of further research, which when undertaken, can lead to more effective outcomes for all. This article introduces the concept of financial edification as an approach to financial education, predicated on the needs of the individual. In repositioning financial education as a pedagogical endeavour, the article asserts that financial education, when not driven by education, cannot achieve its true potential; it is time for Cinderella to go to the ball.     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.     

A NOTE ON SELECTION EFFECTS OF THE HAND RULE

The famous Hand rule weighs the burden of precaution against the reduction in expected harm. The burden may be type‐specific, implying different standards of care for different injurer types. We show that this fact may be exploited by principals in their search for minimized individual costs. Principals may hire agents with high cost of care‐taking although other agents are available. This is shown in a unilateral‐care setting either with perfect or with asymmetric information. We therefore highlight a neglected downside of the negligence rule.