What you are is what you like—similarity biases in venture capitalists' evaluations of start-up teams

This paper extends recent research studying biases in venture capitalist's decision making. We contribute to this literature by analyzing biases arising from similarities between a venture capitalist and members of a venture team. We summarize the psychological foundations of such similarity effects and derive a set of hypotheses regarding the impact of similarity on the assessment of team quality. Using data from a conjoint experiment with 51 respondents, we find that venture capitalists tend to favor teams that are similar to themselves in type of training and professional experience. Our results have important implications for academics and practitioners alike.     

Do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks? New evidence

Kraay [Kraay, A., 2003. Do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks? Journal of International Economics 59, 297-321.] documents the lack of any systematic association between monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack. This paper revisits Kraay's work and modifies it by introducing an improved measure of monetary policy and an additional country-specific fundamental, short-term corporate debt, to capture balance sheet vulnerabilities emphasized by the recent currency crises literature. The results show that for low levels of short-term corporate debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability of a successful attack. This effect decreases and eventually reverses for higher levels of debt. These findings contrast earlier empirical evidence and imply a fundamental reconsideration of the role of monetary policy during currency crises.     

Vertrauen als Basis der Marktwirtschaft

Ohne Zusammenfassung Siegfried F. Franke ist Ordinarius für Wirtschaftspolitik und ?ffentliches Recht an der Universit?t Stuttgart     

Hostages, free lunches and institutional gaps: the case of the European Currency Union

This paper argues that the strong member states of the European Currency Union are hostages of a financially distressed member state so that they are compelled to provide financial support. Moreover, due to the dynamics of the interaction game, a debt relief is a free lunch for the distressed country. This fosters moral hazard of distressed countries. In the absence of capital market control, European politics do not effectively monitor fiscal politics of member states. The lack of a long-term strategy of the European Currency Union to deal with distressed states has undermined the credibility of politics. This lack is also explained by a lack of a European Insolvency Charter. A viable Union requires such a charter with rules for handling distress. Moreover, politics should determine a mechanism to coordinate politics and capital markets in their monitoring of fiscal and economic policy of member states.     

Estimating the long-term effects of advertising on sales: a co-integration perspective

Co-integration econometrics have important theoretical advantages over more traditional approaches to estimating the long-term effects of one variable on another. When advertising and sales data are co-integrated, adaptations of common econometric procedures may be used to estimate the long-term effects directly rather than inferring them from short-term relationships. This paper presents a method for detecting and estimating co-integrating relationships using ordinary least-squares regression procedures. The method is illustrated with the well-known Lydia Pinkham data from 1907 through to 1961. The results show that there was a strong positive relationship between Lydia Pinkham advertising and sales in the long-term. Implications of the method and findings are discussed.     

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates during Currency Crises: the Role of Debt,Institutions, and Financial Openness*

This paper empirically examines the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates during currency crises. We find strong evidence that raising the interest rate: (i) has larger adverse balance sheet effects and is therefore less effective in countries with high domestic corporate short‐term debt; (ii) is more credible and therefore more effective in countries with high‐quality institutions; (iii) is more credible and therefore more effective in countries with high external debt; and (iv) is less effective in countries with high capital account openness. Our results support the idea that the effect of monetary policy depends on its impact on fundamentals, as well as its credibility, as suggested in the recent theoretical literature.