The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good

Summary We study a model of negotiation and coalition formation concerning a public expenditure and its financing. The agents must determine which coalition will jointly produce a public good, how much will be produced, and how the cost is to be shared. Agents that do not belong to the final coalition are excluded from consumption of the public good. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in stationary strategies lead to the formation of the grand coalition with an agreed alternative in the core of the economy. Conversely, for each alternative in the core, there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in (pure) stationary strategies that leads to the formation of the grand coalition with that alternative.I wish to thank Dieter Balkenborg, Georg Noldeke, Shlomo Weber and Eyal Winter for helpful discussions. The comments of an anonymous referee greatly improved the quality of the exposition. Financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 303, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

We introduce several notions of potentials for mechanism design problems with interdependent values, and relate them to implementation in ex-post equilibrium. Whereas ex-post implementation is closely linked to the ordinal concept of best-alternative potentials, the celebrated Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism corresponds to the stronger notion of a cardinal potential: agents agree not only on the best alternative, but also on the quantitative differences between all alternatives. We characterize all valuations that allow for cardinal potentials, and use this characterization for: (1) Identifying valuations for which ex-post implementation is possible; (2) Identifying classes of valuations for which all ex-post implementable choice rules correspond to cardinal potentials. The latter allows us to extend to interdependent valuations a result for dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, due to Roberts (The Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979). We wish to thank an associate editor, two anonymous referees, Paul Milgrom and Burkhard Schipper for helpful comments and stimulating remarks.     

Dynamic price dispersion in airline markets

This study analyzes the factors that explain the variations of daily airfares across fare histories, or dynamic price dispersion. Empirical analyses show that dynamic price dispersion is significantly influenced by demand characteristics variables such as population, income and the share of business passengers, as well as by competitive pressures stemming from the presence of low-cost carriers, but not by the competition intensity. The impact of these variables intensifies as the departure date approaches. These results imply that in the presence of low-cost carriers, full-service carriers tend to adopt a more aggressive high-low pricing strategy.     

Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities

The Weak Government Hypothesis states that government fragmentation leads to higher public deficits and debt. This relation can be explained by government inaction, common pool problems or the strategic use of debt that arise in coalition governments. Importantly, whereas government inaction models concentrate on the short-term effects of government fragmentation on indebtedness, common pool and strategic debt models imply that such effects will persist in the long term. We test these hypotheses using a large panel of data on municipal debt in 298 Flemish municipalities (1977–2000). We find that there is no long-run effect from weak governments. However, there is general support for the fact that the number of parties in a coalition has a positive effect on the municipality’s short-term debt levels–in line with government inaction models.JEL Code: E62, H72, H74     

Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments.      

Impact of Formulas,Language and Instruction on Student Performance on Cost-Volume-Profit Problems

Abstract

This study investigated how three factors impacted performance on cost-volume-profit homework problems: language, formula use, and instruction. Students enrolled in Introduction to Financial Accounting (the first principles of accounting course) and Managerial Accounting (the second principles of accounting course) from eight different US colleges completed homework problems presented in everyday language or accounting language, with or without a formula ‘cheat sheet’ on the screen, and with or without prior instruction. Scores on formula-facilitated questions (those solvable by use of traditional cost-volume-profit formulas) were contrasted with scores on application questions, novel word problems requiring students to apply their knowledge about how cost behavior and sales impact profits. Students performed better on assignments phrased in everyday language. Students with formulas provided during homework completed more formula-facilitated questions correctly but some evidence indicated that they did worse on application questions; more work is needed in this area. Instruction effects were very small. Participants without instruction performed just as well as instructed students when problems were presented in everyday language or if formulas were provided.     

Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments

We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding complex dynamics: endogenous win probabilities in each match depend on other matches’ outcome through the identity of the expected opponent in the next round. The designer seeds competitors according to their ranks. For tournaments with four players we find optimal seedings for three different criteria: (1) maximization of total tournament effort; (2) maximization of the probability of a final among the two top ranked teams; (3) maximization of the win probability for the top player. We also find the seedings ensuring that higher ranked players have a higher winning probability. We compare our predictions with data from NCAA basketball tournaments.