排序方式: 共有46条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
41.
“作为一个在黑土地出生的农家少年,从南开数学到HR,再到总编辑,继而创业,现今又迈入我视为终身事业的教育领域,梦想一次又一次幸运地照进我平凡的现实。”李善友说道。他的朋友这么形容李善友,他拼命抓住一切可能的机会,把困难当成“学习和锻炼的良机,愈挫愈奋,越战越勇”。 相似文献
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We characterize the incentive compatible, constrained efficient policy (“second-best”) in a dynamic matching environment, where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents? values. We also derive conditions on the learning process ensuring that the complete-information, dynamically efficient allocation of resources (“first-best”) is incentive compatible. Our analysis reveals and exploits close, formal relations between the problem of ensuring implementable allocation rules in our dynamic allocation problems with incomplete information and learning, and between the classical problem, posed by Rothschild (1974) [20], of finding optimal stopping policies for search that are characterized by a reservation price property. 相似文献
43.
License Auctions and Market Structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Heidrun C. Hoppe Philippe Jehiel Benny Moldovanu 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2006,15(2):371-396
We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony. 相似文献
44.
An economic perspective on auctions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
46.
The consumption of an indivisible good causes identity-dependent externalities to non-consumers. We analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure, but cannot commit to future actions. We ask the following questions: (1) Does the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer? (2) Is the outcome always efficient? The major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency. This result complements the Coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency. 相似文献