Safer piping: Awareness training for the process industries

The ‘Safer Piping’ video training package was produced by the International Process Safety Group (IPSG) to meet the urgent need for training material to stem the ever–growing number of accidents directly caused by piping failures. The IPSG, then under the Chairmanship of Bob Mill, Exxon Chemical Corporation, identified piping as the single most important cause of concern in a process plant. The aim was to raise safety standards by changing people's attitudes to piping.     

Recent Developments in the German Apprenticeship System

After passing through a period of relative crisis in the first half of the 1980s, by the end of the decade the 'dual system' appeared once again capable of providing Germany with the highly skilled work force it needed to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. This paper reviews the changing nature of apprenticeships and apprentices that has taken place over the last decade and the responses of government, the training authorities and employers to the sharp decline in the number of young people entering the labour market in recent years. Particular attention is given to the process of reforming and updating training regulations — a major concern of the parties involved in training over the last two decades. Finally, the paper suggests that unification of the two Germanies makes the future of the youth labour market and the labour market for skilled workers very unclear.     

Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions

Summary We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the independent private value model. We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same minimum and if this minimum is not a mass point of any of these distributions, then a Nash equilibrium of the first price auction exists. We then modify the first price auction game by adding a closed interval of messages. Every bidder has to send a message with the bid he submits. These messages are used in the resolution of the ties. The winner of the auction is chosen randomly among the highest bidders with the highest value of the message among the highest bidders. In the general case, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this augmented first price auction.I wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko and a referee for their comments on an earlier draft.