LA DÉLÉGATION DES SERVICES PUBLICS AUX ASSOCIATIONS PAR LES COLLECTIVITÉS LOCALES:

RÉSUMÉ ** : Dans le cadre communal français, des biens collectifs locaux sont offerts simultanement par les municipalités et par les associations. Toutefois, l'offre publique ne signifie pas toujours la production publique. Les municipalités peuvent ainsi déléguer la gestion de services collectifs locaux à des entreprises privées ou à des associations. La plupart du temps, les communes se contenteront de subventionner laproduction associative.
Aprés avoir précisé la distinction entre fourniture et production de biens, et le cadre légal et administratif particulier dans lequel s'inscrit la fourniture publique communale des biens et services collectifs locaux, nous soulignons les causes et les formes dupartenariat entre secteur public communal et associations, et les catégories d'actions associatives répondant aux attentes des municipalités.     

Semi-analytical prices for lookback and barrier options under the Heston model

Decisions in Economics and Finance - Under the Heston stochastic volatility model, we derive semi-analytical formulas for the prices of path-dependent options with payoffs linked to the maximum or...     

From volatility smiles to the volatility of volatility

Decisions in Economics and Finance - The paper reviews models of the option surface and reduced-form models for stochastic volatility in continuous time, under the risk-neutral measure. It defines...     

Restructuring Japanese business through Kyosei: Capitalizing on international strategic alliances at the consumer level

Japan of the post-bubble era is the object of much reflection and speculation pertaining to risutora or restructuring of the economy. This study provides a novel, analytical perspective on the fundamental issues involved in the shift of momentum that characterizes Japanese business and economic restructuring. After examining the economic and corporate dimensions of the transitional forces that shape Japan's restructuring process, this study focuses on two powerful, yet often ignored, agents of change: the emergence of a new class of collaborative mandates, kyosei, and the rise of consumer power. The study further emphasizes the importance of planning and managing corporate-level restructuring activities with the interests of end users in mind, by empirically demonstrating the significance of strategic alliances, as a corporate restructuring option, on consumers. The results show that consumers' impression of alliances with Japanese firms have a strong effect on future attitudes toward each partnering brand. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Stability induced by “no-quibbling”

We demonstrate the important consequence of one particular type of voter behavior: the “differentiation” (“no-quibbling”) constraint that alternatives too similar to the alternative which they might replace will not be considered. We find that imposition of a sufficient differentiation norm leads to stable outcomes of decision making in a spatial context. We also briefly consider the potential effects of other possible constraints on feasible choices, especially as these might synergistically interact with choices based on “no-quibbling.”     

Marketing program standardization: A cross-country exploration

This study explores the antecedents and consequences of marketing program standardization in subsidiaries of multinational corporations by contrasting the case of a lead market (Japan) and of an emerging market (Turkey). The findings show that: (1) marketing program standardization is positively related to performance in Japan and Turkey; (2) centralization of nonproduct decision is negatively related to performance in both markets; (3) customer similarity is positively related to marketing program standardization in both Japan and Turkey. Whereas, in Japan, marketing program standardization has a direct, positive relationship to performance, in Turkey, in addition to such a direct effect, there is also an indirect effect at work, through centralization of nonproduct decision.     

Protection and Trade in Services: A Survey

This paper surveys the literature on trade in services, focusing on the policies that are used to restrict such trade, the gains from liberalization, and the institutional mechanisms that have been adopted in the pursuit of liberalization. The paper argues that technological progress and international trade negotiations are likely to keep liberalization of trade in services a high profile policy issue. It also suggests that the research agenda should focus on developing better estimates of the welfare costs of protectionism in the service sector.     

The predictive ability of a risk-adjusted yield spread for economic activity in Europe

This paper examines whether the pricing of risk is important for macroeconomic activity at the country level. We design a risk-adjusted yield spread and test its predictive content for economic activity on the periphery and the centre of Europe over the 1990–2012 period. This risk-adjusted bond yield spread is defined in a cross-country context and referred to as the GZ-type spread. Increases in the yield on corporate bonds issued in the countries on the periphery relative to the riskless yield (calculated using German zero-coupon term structure data) reflect increases in the risk premium that the financial market imposes on borrowers. The risk premium rises in all countries during European-wide recessions of the recent past, particularly those associated with the Global Financial and the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Our findings indicate further that this GZ-type spread acts as a reliable signal for imminent and near-term economic activity in countries where financial markets were shaken to their foundations during the Crisis period. For Germany, the GZ-spread has predictive content for industrial production but not for the unemployment rate. For GDP its predictive ability is confined to the EMU period.     

First‐price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure

Although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two‐bidder first‐price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret, the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed. Nevertheless, we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure. Thus, if the bidders follow this equilibrium, the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs.