An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.     

E-banking comes to town: Exploring how traditional UK high street banks are meeting the challenge of technology and virtual relationships

UK high street banks are continuing to extend the choice of channel through which customers can manage their moneycolon; an obvious example is e-banking. They have been keen to exploit technological advances and changing customer attitudes to alternative channels. Additionally, competition from leaner new market entrants has provided an added incentive to adopt new approaches. In the light of such developments, it is worth reflecting on the changing nature of the bank–customer relationship. This paper suggests that banks are finding it difficult to manage relationships effectively due, in large measure, to the sheer volume of customer data generated by new interactive, technology-based channels. Paradoxically, it seems that the more data banks have about customers the less likely they are to know them on a personal level. It is further suggested that channels such as e-banking potentially reduce the level of personal contact between bank and customer to the extent that a ‘virtual’ relationship develops. This paper concludes that, given the tendency towards ‘virtualisation’, it is inconceivable that bank–customer relationships will become any more intimate in the future. Indeed, a greater degree of personalisation in customer communication may be the very best that banks are able to offer.