Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington, Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson, Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Managerial bonding and stock liquidity: An analysis of dual-class firms

Given the decision to create a second class of stock through a dual-class structure, we propose that management is more (less) likely to create a liquid secondary market for both classes of shares the lower (higher) its willingness to tie its personal wealth to firm performance. If market makers recognize this relation, they should assign a higher likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of firms that list both classes of stock and a lower likelihood for firms that list only one class of stock pursuant to recapitalization. Additionally, they should assign a lower likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of IPOs that choose a dual-class structure and list only one class relative to IPOs that remain single-class. Our empirical tests based on IPOS and recaps between 1985 and 1988 provide support for these propositions.     

Ownership structure and golden parachutes: Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment?

Using a sample of S & P 500 firms, we find that golden parachutes are associated with concentrated external ownership, less concentrated internal ownership, and non-Delaware incorporation. We find little support that concentrated external owners use golden parachutes as credible commitment devices. The general multivariate results support the incentive alignment hypothesis, and reaffirm the view that golden parachutes are a mechanism used to align managerial and shareholder interests when there is a separation between ownership and control. (JEL G32)     

The Morishima gross elasticity of substitution

We show that the Hotelling–Lau elasticity of substitution, an extension of the Allen–Uzawa elasticity to allow for optimal output-quantity (or utility) responses to changes in factor prices, inherits all of the failings of the Allen–Uzawa elasticity identified by Blackorby and Russell [(1989) Am Econ Rev 79: 882–888]. An analogous extension of the Morishima elasticity of substitution to allow for output quantity changes preserves the salient properties of the original Hicksian notion of elasticity of substitution. We thank Paolo Bertoletti for drawing our attention to the issue addressed in this paper and for his comments on an earlier draft.     

最终控制人特征与上市公司现金股利政策

本文以2002年-2004年上市公司的股利分配数据,实证检验了最终控制人的特征对上市公司现金股利政策的影响.结果表明.上市公司现金股利政策与最终控制人的侵害动机成反比,现金股利的支付率随着最终控制人控制权比例的增加呈先减少后增加的U形变动;两权分离程度越小,派发现金股利的水平就越大,但这种影响主要来自于较高的现金流量权,现金流量权比例越大,派发现金股利的概率和水平也越大;最终控制人性质为政府尤其是地方政府时,上市公司派发现金股利的概率和水平更高.     

综合管理体系及其实施指南的研究

依据ISO9001、ISO14001及OHSAS18001标准，对企业中的质量、环境及职业安全卫生要素进行了系统的整合，提出了综合管理体系模式及实施指南。     

Public goods provision: Unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core

In a simple model of one public good producible from one input, we show that unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules have two properties. First, a unit-by-unit cost-sharing rulealways chooses a core allocation. Second, every allocation in the core will be chosen by at least one unit-by-unit cost-shring rule. We argue that costs should be shared on a unit-by-unit basis. We propose a simple mechanism to implement the family of unit-by-unit rules. Received: 18 May 2005, Accepted: 6 December 2005 JEL Classification: H41, C72, D78 I thank Hervé Moulin for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are mine. Financial support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council under grant RGC-DAG99/00.BM52 is gratefully acknowledged.