Determinants of Nominal Interest Rates in India

Journal of Quantitative Economics - This paper examines the role of monetary factors in the variation of nominal interest rates in India for the deregulated regime of interest rates and the...     

Is it the wage premium that targets worker turnovers?

The literature on FDI shows that there exists a wage premium that multinational enterprises (MNEs) pay to local workers and link this to a technology spillover argument. The MNEs pay higher wages to prevent worker turnovers and technology leakages. Literature relates the wage premium aspect of FDI using worker mobility data and uses worker turnovers and the technology spillover argument. We relate stock options in the FDI context of worker mobility and find in a simplified framework that the turnover of workers would depend on the relative payments of stock options.     

Optimal Organization of Surrogacy Contracts and Underinvestment

We develop a theoretical model of commercial gestational surrogacy in which a childless couple approaches a prospective surrogate, who is willing to gestate for the couple. We use a Principal-Agent framework with continuous effort to argue the following: in presence of limited liability of the surrogate, provision of optimal incentives (under non-contractible effort) is not feasible. Hence, a surrogate facing low outside option and having limited wealth is always found to put in sub-optimal care for the fetus. Put differently, the surrogate cannot be made a residual claimant (cannot be entitled with custody rights of the fetus) and therefore eliciting first best care is never optimal. But this result dramatically changes when the model is cast in discrete effort where inefficiency is likely only when the surrogate faces low outside option whereas we get multiple efficient contracts for higher outside option. Moreover, we see first-best efficient contracts may be implemented even without full transfer of custody rights to the surrogate.

     

Do Proprietary Algorithmic Traders Withdraw Liquidity during Market Stress?

We investigate the role of proprietary algorithmic traders in facilitating liquidity in a limit order market. Using order‐level data from the National Stock Exchange of India, we find that proprietary algorithmic traders increase limit order supply following periods of both high short‐term stock‐specific volatility and extreme stock price movement. Even following periods of high marketwide volatility, they do not decrease their supply of liquidity. We define orders from high‐frequency traders as a subclass of orders from proprietary algorithmic traders that are revised in less than three milliseconds. The behavior of high‐frequency trading mimics the behavior of its parent class. This is inconsistent with the theory that fast traders leave the market when stress situations arise, although their limit‐order‐supplying behavior becomes weaker when the increase in short‐term volatility is more informational than transitory. Agency algorithmic traders and nonalgorithmic traders behave opposite to proprietary algorithmic traders by reducing the supply of liquidity during stress situations. The presence of faster traders in the market possibly instills the fear of adverse selection in them. We document that the order imbalance of agency algorithmic traders is positively related to future short‐term returns, whereas the order imbalance of proprietary algorithmic traders is negatively related to future short‐term returns.     

Social media as a destination marketing tool: its use by national tourism organisations

India's protected areas (PAs), especially those designated tiger reserves, are popular tourist destinations, experiencing considerable and growing visitor numbers, but the principles of ecotourism are not well implemented. This paper analyses tourism practice in a sample of popular tiger reserves in India according to four principles of responsible ecotourism: minimisation of environmental impacts, generation of funds for conservation, benefits to local communities, and education of visitors. Evidence demonstrates that few criteria of ecotourism are met in most PAs: tourism imposes significant detrimental impacts, little of the generated revenue is captured, local communities get mostly menial jobs, and visitor education is virtually non-existent with tourism geared mainly towards thrill-seeking. The Indian Forest Service, which manages the PAs, is on the whole unprepared and ill-equipped to plan and implement proper ecotourism practices and faces constant pressure from other actors to increase tourism revenue. Periyar National Park stands out as an exception where innovative approaches involving local communities have brought about a significant positive change. Policy recommendations are offered based on limited, low-impact activities with high participation of local communities which is essential to build local support for conservation that has been historically lacking.     

Caste discrimination in the Indian urban labour market

This, the pioneering quantitative analysis of caste in the Indian urban labour market, examines the age-old problem of caste in the light of discrimination theory and government policy. Using a survey of workers in Delhi, the gross wage difference between ‘scheduled’ (untouchable) and ‘non-scheduled’ caste is decomposed into its ‘explained’ and ‘discrimination’ components and, from a model of occupation choice, into wage- and job-discrimination. Discrimination is found to exist, and to operate at least in part through the traditional mechanism, viz. assignment to jobs, with the scheduled castes entering poorly-paid ‘dead-end’ jobs. It is assisted by methods of recruitment based on contacts, prevalent in the manual occupation, which also cause past discrimination to carry over to the present. Its practice serves the economic interests of those who exercise a taste for discrimination.     

Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff

We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.