International Trade,Migration and Unemployment – The Role of Informal Sector

This paper provides an elaborate general equilibrium framework by including informal economic activities in a model of trade, migration and unemployment. Existence of informal activities is critical in generating positive employment effects of liberal trade policies. Following a tariff cut informal wage increases and rate of unemployment goes down under reasonable conditions. Next we generalize the benchmark model to capture the phenomenon of sequential migration: from agriculture to urban informal sector, and then to urban formal sector. Positive employment effect of reformatory trade policy partly owes to the fact that the presence of informal sector directly reduces the cost of migration and, hence, further induces the process of outmigration from agricultural sector. The paper also extends the benchmark model to include both informal intermediate and final good.     

Informed momentum trading versus uninformed “naive” investors strategies

We construct a zero net-worth uninformed “naive investor” who uses a random portfolio allocation strategy. We then compare the returns of the momentum strategist to the return distribution of naive investors. For this purpose we reward momentum profits relative to the return percentiles of the naive investors with scores that are symmetric around the median. The score function thus constructed is invariant and robust to risk factor models. We find that the average scores of the momentum strategies are close to zero (the score of the median) and statistically insignificant over the sample period between 1926 and 2005, various sub-sample periods including the periods examined in [Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993] and [Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001] . The findings are robust with respect to sampling or period-specific effects, tightened score intervals, and the imposition of maximum-weight restrictions on the naive strategies to mitigate market friction considerations.     

Targeting and salesforce compensation: When sales spill over to unprofitable customers

Quantitative Marketing and Economics - Targeting selling efforts towards profitable customers is widely known to increase sales and allow firms to charge higher prices. In this paper, we show that...     

Generalized time-invariant overtaking

We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized time-invariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations defined on finite dimensional spaces. The paper presents a general approach that can be specialized to at least two, extensively researched examples, the utilitarian and the leximin orderings on a finite dimensional Euclidean space.     

The precautionary principle and EMF: implementation and evaluation

The precautionary principle, a recommendation to consider action to avoid a possible harm even if it is not certain to occur, is variously defined and interpreted. We present a range of definitions with an emphasis on their requirements for strength of evidence of harm and for actions to be taken. We describe the variety of approaches that have been adopted in developing policy to address the issue of possible health effects of electric and magnetic fields (EMF) in the face of scientific uncertainty. Further, we discuss specific aspects of scientific uncertainty regarding EMF health risks particularly relevant to the development of precautionary principle policy. We define and discuss prudent avoidance and other unique features of applications of the precautionary principle to EMF. We conclude with examples from EMF policy decisions of risk tradeoffs that need to be considered in developing any precautionary principle policy, and provide recommendations for better ways to define and implement the precautionary principle.     

Stakeholder management and sustainability strategies in the French nuclear industry

This paper describes how a nuclear power corporation integrates sustainability into corporate strategies and practices. The case study focuses on one of the world's largest nuclear power generators and describes the corporate capture of sustainable development in its strategic efforts to promote a growth strategy. The paper shows how corporate strategies to address sustainability concerns involve managing different stakeholders, enabling the corporation to sustain its economic growth strategy. Three types of stakeholder management strategy are identified: reinforcement strategies for supportive stakeholders, containment strategies for obstructive stakeholders and stabilization strategies for passive stakeholders. The paper argues that, despite claims of sustainable development in the nuclear industry, there is no significant shift in the ‘business as usual’ approach and that sustainable development is merely reframed as sustainable growth. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.     

How incumbent firms foster consumer expectations, delay launch but still win the markets for next generation products

Consumers learn quality of many durable products through word-of-mouth information while firms launch new and improved products frequently in these markets. This paper examines firm incentives to invest in R&D to compete for patents in makets where consumers rely on word-of-mouth information and have expectations about the new products before launch. When its loss due to a possible entry is above a threshold, an incumbent has more incentives than a potential entrant to invest in R&D for patents. Moreover, if the current product is more profitable, its true quality is above consumer priors and the quality of the new product is below a threshold, it is optimal for the incumbent to launch the new product after a time lag. The later the optimal time of launch, the greater is the incumbent’s potential loss if entry occurs and greater its incentives is to invest in R&D versus that of the entrants. While potential entrants are generally thought to have more incentives to invest in a drastic innovation which results in a race to launch the new products, we show that the more drastic the innovation, the later the optimal time of launch and greater are the incumbent’s incentives to invest in R&D when the value added of the new product can be conveyed to all the consumers. Only when consumers are uncertain about the value added of the new product, the incumbent’s incentives are lower. We also demonstrate that by promoting consumer expectations about the new product before launch, an incumbent has more time to launch and higher probability of dominating its market.     

An integrated production-distribution model for a deteriorating inventory item

We develop an integrated production-distribution model for a deteriorating item in a two-echelon supply chain. The supplier’s production batch size is restricted to an integer multiple of the discrete delivery lot quantity to the buyer. Exact cost functions for the supplier, the buyer and the entire supply chain are developed. These lead to the determination of individual optimal policies, as well as the optimal policy for the overall, integrated supply chain. We outline a procedure for determining the optimal supply chain decisions with the objective of minimizing the total system cost. Our approach is illustrated through a numerical example.     

Do rational demand functions differ from irrational ones? Evidence from an induced budget experiment

Various studies (e.g. Becker, 1962; Ariely et al., 2003) have noted anomalies concerning the relationship between observed demand and the preferences presumed to motivate it. We re-examine these findings using experimental choice data. After separating our subjects’ choices into rational and irrational subsets based on consistency with the axioms of revealed preference, we estimate and compare demand coefficients. Mirroring Ariely et al.'s ‘coherently arbitrary’ choice, both rational and irrational demand estimates exhibit negative price and positive endowment coefficients. However, a comparison of the full set of demand coefficients indicates significant differences between the two, yielding an observable artefact of the preference hypothesis. Relaxing the goodness-of-fit of the revealed preference test (Afriat, 1987; Varian, 1994) does not alter our findings.