Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington, Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson, Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Managerial bonding and stock liquidity: An analysis of dual-class firms

Given the decision to create a second class of stock through a dual-class structure, we propose that management is more (less) likely to create a liquid secondary market for both classes of shares the lower (higher) its willingness to tie its personal wealth to firm performance. If market makers recognize this relation, they should assign a higher likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of firms that list both classes of stock and a lower likelihood for firms that list only one class of stock pursuant to recapitalization. Additionally, they should assign a lower likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of IPOs that choose a dual-class structure and list only one class relative to IPOs that remain single-class. Our empirical tests based on IPOS and recaps between 1985 and 1988 provide support for these propositions.     

Ownership structure and golden parachutes: Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment?

Using a sample of S & P 500 firms, we find that golden parachutes are associated with concentrated external ownership, less concentrated internal ownership, and non-Delaware incorporation. We find little support that concentrated external owners use golden parachutes as credible commitment devices. The general multivariate results support the incentive alignment hypothesis, and reaffirm the view that golden parachutes are a mechanism used to align managerial and shareholder interests when there is a separation between ownership and control. (JEL G32)     

A comparison of parametric and non-parametric efficiency measures: The case of Norwegian ferries

The trunk road system in Norway has to be supplemented by a number of ferries due to the long coastline with numerous islands and fjords. Most of the ferries are run by private companies, but at a loss. The deficit are covered by the Ministry of Transport. The subsidies have risen rapidly in the last years and have focussed attention on whether the ferries are really run as efficiently as possible. To change the incentives to economize, a lump-sum payment is considered. To implement such a system, an initial assessment of reasonable input requirements is needed. The aim of this article is to provide such a yardstick by establishing a best practice frontier. Both a non-parametric and a parametric approach to a deterministic frontier are tried and differences of results discussed. Peculiarities due to choice of methods are revealed. The efficiency distributions are quite similar for the two methods except for scale efficiency, where the parametric method indicates substantial unrealized scale economies, while the non-parametric approach shows the largest and some small ferries to be scale efficient. The results indicate a substantial rationalization potential of about 30 percent in total.I am indebted to three referees for forcing me to improve significantly the quality of the study. Any remaining shortcomings are, of course, my responsibility.     

The Morishima gross elasticity of substitution

We show that the Hotelling–Lau elasticity of substitution, an extension of the Allen–Uzawa elasticity to allow for optimal output-quantity (or utility) responses to changes in factor prices, inherits all of the failings of the Allen–Uzawa elasticity identified by Blackorby and Russell [(1989) Am Econ Rev 79: 882–888]. An analogous extension of the Morishima elasticity of substitution to allow for output quantity changes preserves the salient properties of the original Hicksian notion of elasticity of substitution. We thank Paolo Bertoletti for drawing our attention to the issue addressed in this paper and for his comments on an earlier draft.     

Ownership structure and post-issue operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings in Thailand

This paper investigates the post-issue operating performance of companies that conducted seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) during the period 1991 to 1994. It is documented that SEO firms exhibited declining operating performance after the offering. Further, there is a negative relation between inside ownership concentration and postissue operating performance decline. In support of the signaling effect, the ratio of issue proceeds to pre-issue equity also negatively relates to post-issue operating performance. Further, the negative relation between issue proceeds and operating performance decline is intensified among SEO firms with high insider ownership concentration. The finding offers evidence in support of agency conflicts and information asymmetry and suggests that the two factors are operating simultaneously.