An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation

We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuringtrading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resourcetransfers and global participation, a scheme which we call ‘IdealKyoto Protocol’, yields an efficient equilibrium allocationfor a global economy. An altruistic international agency—say,the Global Environment Facility—should operate the resourcetransfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments shouldbe able to make independent policy commitments regarding howto control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipationof the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggeststhat the USA should be ‘bribed’ to reverse its decisionof not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.     

Getting the attention you need

Employees have an enormous amount of business information at their fingertips--more specifically, at their desktops. The floodgates are open; profitable possibilities abound. But having to handle all that information has pushed downsized staffs to the brink of an acute attention deficit disorder. To achieve corporate goals, business leaders need their employees' full attention--and that attention is in short supply. Authors Thomas Davenport and John Beck have studied how companies manage the attention of their employees and their site visitors. In this article, they analyze the components of attention management through three lenses--economic, psychobiological, and technological--and offer guidelines for keeping employees focused on crucial corporate tasks. Their lessons are drawn from the best practices employed by today's stickiest Web sites and by traditional attention industries such as advertising, film, and television. The authors say executives must manage attention knowing that it's a zero-sum game (there's only so much to go around). Managers should also consider capitalizing on the basic survival and competitive instincts we all have that help determine how much attention we pay to certain things. For instance, the threat of corporate demise--and the consequent loss of jobs and livelihoods--undoubtedly focuses workers' attention on the need to change. Likewise, internal competition among business units may give employees added incentive to pay attention to a profit or sales goal. Leaders today need to pay more attention to attention because it's widely misunderstood and widely mismanaged, the authors conclude.     

Qualified medical child support orders--California health insurance coverage assignment orders--national medical support notices: what's a plan administrator to do?

Many employer-sponsored health plans and multi-employer health benefit trusts have seen an increase in medical child support orders (MCSOs), and they can anticipate receiving a greater number in the future. Once regulations are final for the national medical support notice (NMSN) required by the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, plans should also begin receiving these. In preparation, plan administrators should ensure that they have proper procedures in place for determining whether MCSOs and NMSNs constitute QMCSOs.     

The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock price effects due to the simultaneous occurrence of the positive real effect of monitoring and the opposing information effect. (ii) The combination of board monitoring and monitoring by other parties prevents assessing the value relevance of board monitoring in isolation. (iii) The confounding effect of a simultaneous successor appointment typically generates an upward biased estimate. Based on an analysis of price effects and trading volumes at announcement, we conclude that monitoring by the supervisory board is valued by investors: Forced departures of executive directors, also without a successor appointment, are value relevant in the Netherlands where external control mechanisms and shareholder control were virtually absent in the period studied (1991–2000).