Identifying the woes of the cotton textile industry in Bengal: tales of the nineteenth century

This article seeks to answer three basic questions about the nineteenth‐century cotton textile industry in Bengal that still remain unresolved in the literature; namely, when did the industry begin to decay, what was the extent of its decay during the early nineteenth century, and what were the factors that led to this? In the absence of data on production, this article seeks to settle the debate on the basis of the industry's market performance and its consumption of raw materials. It contests the prevailing hypothesis that the industry's perpetual decline started in the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century. Instead, it is argued that the decline started around the mid‐1820s. The pace of its decline was, however, slow though steady at the beginning, but reached crisis point by 1860, when around 563,000 workers lost their jobs. Regarding the extent of its decay, this article concludes that the industry was diminished by about 28 per cent by the mid‐1800s. However, it survived in the high‐end and low‐end domestic markets. Evidence is also gathered in favour of the hypothesis that, although British discriminatory policies undoubtedly depressed the industry's export outlet, its decay is better explained by technological innovations in Great Britain.     

Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment

Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services.     

A Review of the Review

In 1997 a process started to review the 1988 Basel I Accord, which ultimately led to the Basel II Accord of June 2004. In this paper Sir Howard Davies, Director of the London School of Economics and Former Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, provides an analysis of this review process. Several issues related to the complexity and implementability of the Accord are discussed. Although the author thinks that Basel II has many appealing aspects (such as the three‐pillar framework), he argues that the outcome is very complicated, it took a very long time, and needs to be adapted in ways not originally envisaged. He calls for a "Review of the Review" to see what lessons can be learnt from the review process which might be helpful for the future.     

'THE LAW OF STORMS': EUROPEAN AND INDIGENOUS RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS IN COLONIAL INDIA, c. 1800–1850

Focusing on collective response to storms and floods in early colonial India, the paper explores obstacles to successful disaster response with one example related to meteorology of cyclones and the other the use of embankments. In both these examples, there was an attempt to build public-private partnerships, which succeeded in the case of weather prediction and failed in river embankment. The failure is explained by two factors. Coordination and contracting were costly when the private partners had variable capacities and interests. Furthermore, whereas meteorology predicted nature, embankments interfered with nature, an intervention which carried social and economic costs.     

Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality

ABSTRACT . The paper presents an account of social institutions on the basis of collective acceptance. Basically, collective acceptance by some members of a group involves the members’ collectively coming to hold and holding a relevant social attitude (a “we‐attitude”), viz. either one in the intention family of concepts or one in the belief family. In standard cases the collective acceptance must be in the “we‐mode,” viz. performed as a group member, and involve that it be meant for the group. The participants must be collectively committed to what they have accepted. Social institutions are taken to be norm‐governed social practices introducing a new social and conceptual status on the practices or some elements involved in those practices. This requires that some of the involved norms be constitutive norms as opposed to merely “accidentally” regulating ones. A classification of social institutions is presented. The account is broader in scope than is Searle’s.