The inflation and inflation uncertainty relationship for Turkey: a dynamic framework

This article assesses the interaction between inflation and inflation uncertainty in a dynamic framework for Turkey by using monthly data for the time period 1984–2009. The bulk of previous studies investigating the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty employ Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH)-type models, which consider inflation uncertainty as a predetermined function of innovations to inflation specification. The stochastic volatility in mean (SVM) models that we use allow for gathering innovations to inflation uncertainty and assess the effect of inflation volatility shocks on inflation over time. When we assess the interaction between inflation and its volatility, the empirical findings indicate that response of inflation to inflation volatility is positive and statistically significant. However, the response of inflation volatility to inflation is negative but not statistically significant.     

Greece in 2010: A Tragedy Without(?) Catharsis

The Greek crisis in 2010 was a tragedy waiting to happen. However, and contrary to the impression created by the stabilization program’s immediate focus on restoring fiscal balance, its roots lie in the erosion of international competitiveness over the past three decades and the attendant de-industrialization of the country. Catharsis, i.e., the creation of the conditions for sustainable long-run growth, requires a coherent, medium-term strategy, bolstered by wide social consensus, to improve competitiveness and redeploy labor and other production factors to the tradeable sector. Nevertheless, owing to the accumulated imbalances, catharsis is fraught with risks. Yet, the proposed alternatives, such as, government debt rescheduling with possible discount and a temporary or permanent exit from EMU, are even worse. They are not likely to succeed, for they do not adequately address the dramatic erosion of competitiveness and have severe potential repercussions.     

Roles played by financial development in economic growth: application of the flexible regression model

This study presents the nonlinear relationship that exists between financial development and economic growth. This study applies the flexible nonlinear regression model of Hamilton (Econometrica 69(3):537–573, 2001) because it imposes no specification restrictions. Two empirical results are obtained. First, an inverted U-shaped relation between banking sector development and economic growth is identified. Namely, the two variables are positively linked before the turning point, but negatively linked after it. Second, a positive relationship with asymmetric √-shape between stock market development and economic growth is found.     

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

A Bayesian Bioeconometric Model of Invasive Species Control: The Case of the Hemlock Woolly Adelgid

In this article we evaluate a US Forest Service plan to mitigate damages from an invasive insect on public, forested land. We develop a dynamic model of infestation and control to explicitly account for biological interactions, baseline conditions, and uncertainty, thus creating a more complete picture of policy impacts than a static cost benefit analysis could provide. We combine the results of the dynamic model with an empirical study of nonmarket forest benefits to create a bioeconomic model of ecosystem management. Estimating the empirical model in a Bayesian framework allows us to treat the economic coefficients of the dynamic model as random variables. We specify distributions for the biological parameters and examine the effects of both biological and economic uncertainty on the predictive distribution of net benefits. We find that the net benefits of the program are positive, and that uncertainty in the biological model contributes substantially more to the variance of our estimate than does uncertainty over the valuation of the resource.     

Assessing fiscal sustainability subject to policy changes: a Markov switching cointegration approach

We propose a Markov switching cointegration approach to assess long run fiscal sustainability. This method allows us to simultaneously: (1) test for cointegration in the presence of significant fiscal policy changes; (2) assess the type of fiscal regime that a country experienced at a given period and (3) analyse the timing of the transition between the estimated regime types. Given its flexibility, our approach enable us to uncover a richer and more complex dynamics in the analysis of fiscal sustainability, which standard linear cointegration methods fail to capture.     

On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games

We propose a single framework for studying the existence of approximate and exact pure strategy equilibria in payoff secure games. Central to the framework is the notion of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed point theorem, we first show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem that covers a number of known games. Then a short proof of Reny’s (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) equilibrium existence theorem is provided for payoff secure games with metrizable strategy spaces. We also give a simple proof of Reny’s theorem in its general form for metric games in an appendix for the sake of completeness.     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.