Do Portfolio Manager Contracts Contract Portfolio Management?

Most mutual fund managers have performance‐based contracts. Our theory predicts that mutual fund managers with asymmetric contracts and mid‐year performance close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As predicted by our theory, performance deviation from the benchmark decreases risk‐shifting only for managers with performance contracts. Deviation from the benchmark dominates incentives from the flow‐performance relation, suggesting that risk‐shifting is motivated more by management contracts than by a tournament to capture flows.     

RELATIVE RISK CHARACTERISTICS OF ROLLING HORIZON HEDGING HEURISTICS FOR CAPACITY EXPANSION

This paper applies measures of risk to capacity expansion decisions made under uncertainty. Eight different decision making rules are constructed by varying both the frequency of the forecast updates and the hedge against uncertainty in a rolling horizon heuristic procedure. Using demand, capacity, and cost data from the utility division of a manufacturing company, the risk characteristics of each decision making rule are evaluated by simulation. The results indicate that annual forecast revisions hedged by ninety percent prediction limits are preferred over decision rules with less frequent forecast revisions or fixed-width hedges.     

Religion,Corruption, and the Rule of Law

In a 207‐country sample, we find that rule of law and corruption are both associated with a country's religious heritage, thereby partially explaining the correlation between religion and economic growth found in previous research. We also show that our results change when we control for some variables lacking data for all countries in the sample but that these differences are attributable to changes in sample composition rather than the effects of the control variables. Our research suggests that researchers doing cross‐country analysis should distinguish between the effects of adding a control variable and the resulting sample composition effects.     

Management Forecast Consistency

We posit that management forecasts, which are predictable transformations of realized earnings without random errors, are more informative than unbiased forecasts, which manifest small but unpredictable errors, even if biased forecasts are less accurate. Consistent with this intuition, we find that managers who make consistent forecasting errors have a greater ability to influence investor reactions and analyst revisions, even after controlling for the effect of accuracy. This effect is more economically significant and statistically robust than that of forecast accuracy. More sophisticated investors and experienced analysts are found to have a better understanding of the benefits of consistent management forecasts.     

Trend Inflation and the Nature of Structural Breaks in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

We show that with a unit root in inflation, the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) implies an unobserved components model with a stochastic trend component and an inflation gap. Our empirical results suggest that with an increase in trend inflation during the Great Inflation, the response of inflation to real economic activity decreases and the persistence of the inflation gap increases due to an increase in the persistence of the unobserved stationary component. These results are in line with the predictions of Cogley and Sbordone ( 2008 ), who show that the coefficients of the NKPC are functions of time‐varying trend inflation.     

Introduction to the Special Issue on Behavioral and Experimental Public Economics

The workshop of the Association for Public Economic Theory on behavioral and experimental public economics was held at Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, Université de Lyon, from June 24 to June 26, 2008. Thirty papers were presented in addition to keynotes by Charlie Plott and John List. The focus of the workshop was to test theoretical models using experimental methods to increase our understanding of the efficiency of mechanisms supporting the provision of public goods, social cooperation, and voting systems. This special issue aims at showing how lively and diversified the ongoing experimental research in public economics has come to be. We highlight three topics in particular: the power of voting and legal enforcement systems, the efficiency of various institutions to support cooperation in social dilemma games, and auctions.     

Oil and the Stock Markets

We test whether the reaction of international stock markets to oil shocks can be justified by current and future changes in real cash flows and/or changes in expected returns. We find that in the postwar period, the reaction of United States and Canadian stock prices to oil shocks can be completely accounted for by the impact of these shocks on real cash flows alone. In contrast, in both the United Kingdom and Japan, innovations in oil prices appear to cause larger changes in stock prices than can be justified by subsequent changes in real cash flows or by changing expected returns.     

Option Trading,Price Discovery,and Earnings News Dissemination*

Abstract. Option market activity increases by more than 10 percent in the four days before quarterly earnings announcements. We show that the direction of this preannouncement trading foreshadows subsequent earnings news. Specifically, we find option traders initiate a greater proportion of long (short) positions immediately before “good” (“bad”) earnings news. Midquote returns to active-side option trades are positive during nonannouncement periods and are significantly higher immediately prior to earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads for options widen during the announcement period, but traders do not gravitate toward high delta contracts. Collectively, the evidence shows option traders participate generally in price discovery (the incorporation of private information in price), and more specifically in the dissemination of earnings news.     

The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets

A series of experiments illustrate that relaxing short‐selling constraints lowers prices in experimental asset markets, but does not induce prices to track fundamentals. We argue that prices in experimental asset markets are influenced by restrictions on short‐selling capacity and limits on the cash available for purchases. Restrictions on short sales in the form of cash reserve requirements and quantity limits on short positions behave in a similar manner. A simulation model, based on DeLong et al. (1990) , generates average price patterns that are similar to the observed data.