Optimal Control in Infinite Horizon Problems: A Sobolev Space Approach

In this paper, we make use of the Sobolev space to derive at once the Pontryagin conditions for the standard optimal growth model in continuous time, including a necessary and sufficient transversality condition. An application to the Ramsey model is given. We use an order ideal argument to solve the problem inherent to the fact that L ¹ spaces have natural positive cones with no interior points. The paper was written when Cuong Le Van was visiting CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, and Cagri Saglam was a research fellow of the Economics Department of the same university. The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee and Takashi Kamihigashi for very useful comments. R. Boucekkine acknowledges the support of the Belgian research programmes PAI P4/01 and ARC 03/08-302.     

Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise

In this paper, we introduce a new two-person bargaining solution, which we call iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise (IKSNC). For its characterization, we present an axiom called \(\varGamma \)-Decomposability which is satisfied by any solution that is decomposable with respect to a given reference solution \(\varGamma \). We show that the IKSNC solution is uniquely characterized by \(\varGamma \)-Decomposability whenever \(\varGamma \) satisfies the standard axioms of Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations and Symmetry, along with three additional axioms, namely Restricted Monotonicity of Individually Best Extensions, Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Weak Pareto Optimality under Symmetry.     

Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly

Review of Economic Design - In this paper, we integrate the bargaining theory with the problem of regulating a natural monopoly under symmetric information or asymmetric information with complete...     

Licensing cost-reducing innovations under supply function competition

In this paper, we study the licensing of cost-reducing innovations in a duopoly under supply function competition. We show that the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to no licensing if its cost advantage is not extremely large. Moreover, if its cost advantage is not extremely small, the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing and mixed licensing to revenue-royalty licensing. This second result arises only because of our assumption that the cost functions are quadratic. We show that if the cost functions are linear and royalty payments are per unit of output, the innovator strictly prefers royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. We also show that in our model, consumer surplus is remarkably higher under any type of licensing than under no licensing. However, revenue-royalty licensing is slightly superior for consumers to the other two types of licensing and only so if the cost advantage of the innovator is sufficiently large.