What Stops Dutch Households from Taking Up Much Needed Benefits?

It is common for individuals not to take up welfare benefits. The most common explanation is that people make a rational choice between the utility they expect from the benefit and the effort required to take‐up. Most studies utilize surveys, which are subject to misreporting and measurement errors, to determine eligibility and non‐take‐up rates. This study uses a novel dataset based on administrative data sources, which provides a more accurate identification of eligible households and take‐up. Furthermore, this study documents non‐take‐up of a compensation to which nearly 5 million Dutch households are entitled. The richness of the data allowed us to conduct a detailed analysis of key drivers of non‐take‐up. The analysis largely confirms the transaction‐costs hypotheses. However, we found an unexpected effect. Although, in general, the probability of take‐up increases when income decreases, those with the lowest income or wealth do not have the highest probability of take‐up.     

The effect of audit market structure on audit quality and audit pricing in the private-client market

This study examines whether audit market structure affects audit quality and audit pricing. We analyze two conceptually distinct dimensions of market structure: audit market concentration and client mobility. Focusing on the private-client segment of the Belgian audit market, we compare the pricing and quality effects of market structure between the segment of small and medium-sized (SME) clients and the segment of large clients to test how audit complexity moderates such effects. We find that market concentration impairs price and quality competition in the SME-client segment. Market concentration is unrelated to audit quality in the large-client segment, where we argue that concentration is endogenous to audit complexity. Furthermore, we find that client mobility stimulates price competition in both segments but improves audit quality only in the large-client segment. We interpret our findings as evidence that (a) audit market concentration impairs competition especially when audits have low complexity and that (b) the large-client market segment, characterized by higher audit complexity and higher market concentration, can also be price and quality competitive if clients are sufficiently mobile, and change auditors relatively frequently.     

Steuern und Risikobereitschaft in Modellen irreversibler Investitionen

This paper provides an overview of the literature on the influence of taxation on investment behavior under uncertainty, especially under the real options paradigm. We analyze the impact of taxation on risk-taking under irreversibility. Extending the existing literature we integrate a simple tax system into a real option model. Under irreversibility and risk neutrality, raising the tax rate can either increase or reduce risk-taking. Referring to combinations of volatility and tax rate it is possible to identify conditions for an unambiguous influence of taxes on risk-taking. Numerical simulations indicate that raising the tax rate increases risk-taking under low volatility. Implementing a final withholding tax on capital income tends to reduce risky investment. Our findings confirm the well-known results under certainty and extend them with respect to uncertainty, irreversibility, and risk-taking.     

The Audit Reporting Debate: Seemingly Intractable Problems and Feasible Solutions

While the audit reporting debate has a long history, a number of recent regulatory initiatives and policy reviews increase the likelihood of change in this area. The purpose of this study is to use this momentum and examine whether there is consensus between audit report users and auditors with regard to the form and content of the audit report. This seems necessary because past audit reporting reforms have failed due to a lack of common ground. Based on interviews with users and auditors, we conclude that reaching a level of consensus seems feasible. Using these insights, we propose an alternative audit reporting model that may significantly reduce the information gap between users and auditors and improve transparency on the quality of audit practice.