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131.
Hélder Vasconcelos 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2008,17(4):973-1010
The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry. 相似文献
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135.
Richard P. O’Neill Emily Bartholomew Fisher Benjamin F. Hobbs Ross Baldick 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2008,34(3):220-250
The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive
power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially
settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for
both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices,
if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission.
The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.
相似文献
136.
Eshien Chong Freddy Huet Stéphane Saussier Faye Steiner 《Review of Industrial Organization》2006,29(1-2):149-169
We use an original database of 5000 French local public authorities to explore the impact of organizational choice and performance as measured by consumer prices. In quantifying the impact of the choice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on performance, we consider the related issue of the determinants of organizational choice. We estimate a switching regressions model to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice, and find that in our sample, (i) the choice by local public authorities to engage in a PPP is not random, and (ii) conditional on the choice of a PPP, consumer prices are significantly higher on average. 相似文献
137.
Bernhard Hirsch 《Controlling & Management》2007,51(2):88-89
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
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140.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献