Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Multiple Imputation in Multivariate Problems When the Imputation and Analysis Models Differ

Bayesian multiple imputation (MI) has become a highly useful paradigm for handling missing values in many settings. In this paper, I compare Bayesian MI with other methods – maximum likelihood, in particular—and point out some of its unique features. One key aspect of MI, the separation of the imputation phase from the analysis phase, can be advantageous in settings where the models underlying the two phases do not agree.     

A comparison of several approximations to the power function of the likelihood ratio test in covariance structure analysis*

In this paper we compare alternative asymptotic approximations to the power of the likelihood ratio test used in covariance structure analysis for testing the fit of a model. Alternative expressions for the noncentrality parameter (ncp) lead to different approximations to the power function. It appears that for alternative covariance matrices close to the null hypothesis, the alternative ncp's lead to similar values, while for alternative covariance matrices far from H_o the different expressions for the ncp can conflict substantively. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the ncp proposed in Satorra and Saris (1985) gives the most accurate power approximations.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

Do Small Banks have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks

Consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concern about the survival of small banks, particularly as it relates to the availability of credit to small businesses. However, if small banks have an advantage in processing credit information, compared to large banks, they should continue to survive in a competitive environment. We evaluate risk-adjusted commercial loan yields (gross yields less net charge-offs and the risk-free rate of return) at small and large banks for the period of 1996 through 2001. Our primary finding is that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks earn greater risk-adjusted yields than larger banks. This result suggests that small banks make better choices from the available small business loans and is consistent with the notion that these banks have an information advantage in evaluating credit.