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21.
Abstract . The agency relationship has been observed in a variety of settings. Churches, like other organizations, are plagued with the typical agency problems of moral hazard, observability, goal displacement, and risk aversion. How do churches cope with these issues in dealing with their most critical resource, clergy? This study analyzes the agency relationship between churches and their clergy. Using data from nine denominations, this study finds strong evidence that pastor compensation is not tied directly to performance, but rather indirectly through promotion tournaments. Successful pastors are rewarded by being called to larger, presumably wealthier and more prestigious, congregations. Since it is so difficult to observe and measure a pastor's performance in specific activities, churches differentiate good pastors from mediocre ones by considering their total performance, rather than any specific activities. 相似文献
22.
There is some debate about the potential value of using devil's advocates in top-level organizational decision-making. In this paper, the contrasting views on this question are summarized briefly and the field and laboratory research on the devil's advocate and related techniques is discussed. This research is then used as the basis for detailed suggestions on the effective use of devil's advocates in improving managerial decisions. 相似文献
23.
24.
An empirical test of trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Thomas G. Brashear James S. Boles Danny N. Bellenger Charles M. Brooks 《Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science》2003,31(2):189-200
This study examines three trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships. This study, based
on a sample of more than 400 business-to-business salespeoples from a variety of industries, shows two trust-building processes
(predictive and identification) to be significantly related to salesperson trust in the sales manager. Interpersonal trust
was found to be most strongly related to shared values and respect. Trust was directly related to job satisfaction and relationalism,
and indirectly related to organizational commitment and turnover intention.
Thomas G. Brashear (brashear@mktg.umass.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Isenberg School
of Management at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.
James S. Boles (jboles@gsu.edu) (Ph.D., Louisiana State University) is an associate professor of marketing in the Robinson College of Business
at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a variety of journals, including theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. His areas of research interest include personal selling, sales management, key and strategic account management, and business
relationships.
Danny N. Bellenger (mktdnb@langate.gsu.edu) (Ph.D., University of Alabama) is currently chairman of the Marketing Department in the Robinson
College of Business at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a number of academic journals including theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Advertising Research, theCalifornia Management Review, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, Industrial Marketing Management, and theJournal of Business Research. He has authored four monographs and four textbooks on marketing research, sales, and retailing.
Charles M. Brooks (brooks@quinnipiac.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an associate professor and chair of the Department of Marketing
and Advertising at Quinnipiac University. His research has appeared in theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of Retailing, Marketing Theory, and theJournal of Marketing Theory and Practice. 相似文献
25.
We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are “international” in economic structure with multiple input, output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents, the economies are characterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described. 相似文献
26.
This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of difficulty is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.JEL classifications: Q5, H4, D7, D8An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Resource Economics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, June 2002. 相似文献
27.
Charles C. Okeahalam 《International Review of Applied Economics》2007,21(5):669-685
Indicators of market power can be ambiguous because cost economies associated with scale and not market imperfections may influence results. This article illustrates that without direct measures of concentration, estimates of costs, scale economies and profitability can be used to identify market power in banking. Secondly, via this method, econometric estimates provide meaningful evidence of market power in the South African banking sector over the study sample period (1979–1998). A reasonable conclusion is that while industrial structure is important, careful consideration needs to be given to cost economies and profitability when assessing market power. In addition, there is a need to consider appropriate policy to reduce market power in banking in South Africa. 相似文献
28.
Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain
about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation
(CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical
nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental
evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components
that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private
good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a
probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the
winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in
the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion
of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness
of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect
on the winning bid.
相似文献
29.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献
30.
Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work. 相似文献