Trade uncertainty and the two-step procedure: The choice of numeraire and exact indexation

Summary In a small open economy it is optimal to first maximize national income and second choose the best consumption point.The same two-step procedure under (quantitative) uncertainty is suboptimal if one of the goods is used as numéraire. Optimality is restored however, if nominal prices are deflated by the exact price index. Hence there is equivalence between the appropriate two-step procedure and the introduction of a stock market under uncertainty (Diamond 1967) under ideal circumstances.I would like to thank, without implicating, Peter van Bergeijk, Steven Brakman, Willem Buiter, Richard Gigengack, Jean-Marie, Viaene, Casper de Vries and an anonymous referee for useful comments and Angelique van Haasteren and Martijn Herrmann for graphical assistance.     

Gender-Based Vicarious Sensitivity to Disempowering Behavior in Organizations: Exploring an Expanded Concept of Hostile Working Environment

The purpose of this study was to explore evidence of gender-based vicarious sensitivity to disempowering behavior in organizations, expanding the concept of hostile working environment beyond the context of sexual harassment. Male and female graduate and undergraduate students viewed 10 video segments of Anita Hill's interview by U.S. senators during the October 1991 confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice Nominee, Clarence Thomas. Although no significant relationship was found between the personal attributes of age and ethnicity to perceptions of disempowering behavior, female participants reported seeing significantly more offensive behavior in the video segments than did male participants. The results are discussed in terms of greater female sensitivity to common forms of disempowering behavior in organizations, and having a disparate negative impact and systematically placing women at a disadvantage in today's workforce.     

The Agency Relationship in Churches: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract . The agency relationship has been observed in a variety of settings. Churches, like other organizations, are plagued with the typical agency problems of moral hazard, observability, goal displacement, and risk aversion. How do churches cope with these issues in dealing with their most critical resource, clergy? This study analyzes the agency relationship between churches and their clergy. Using data from nine denominations, this study finds strong evidence that pastor compensation is not tied directly to performance, but rather indirectly through promotion tournaments. Successful pastors are rewarded by being called to larger, presumably wealthier and more prestigious, congregations. Since it is so difficult to observe and measure a pastor's performance in specific activities, churches differentiate good pastors from mediocre ones by considering their total performance, rather than any specific activities.     

DEVIL'S ADVOCACY IN MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING

There is some debate about the potential value of using devil's advocates in top-level organizational decision-making. In this paper, the contrasting views on this question are summarized briefly and the field and laboratory research on the devil's advocate and related techniques is discussed. This research is then used as the basis for detailed suggestions on the effective use of devil's advocates in improving managerial decisions.     

The Morishima gross elasticity of substitution

We show that the Hotelling–Lau elasticity of substitution, an extension of the Allen–Uzawa elasticity to allow for optimal output-quantity (or utility) responses to changes in factor prices, inherits all of the failings of the Allen–Uzawa elasticity identified by Blackorby and Russell [(1989) Am Econ Rev 79: 882–888]. An analogous extension of the Morishima elasticity of substitution to allow for output quantity changes preserves the salient properties of the original Hicksian notion of elasticity of substitution. We thank Paolo Bertoletti for drawing our attention to the issue addressed in this paper and for his comments on an earlier draft.     

An empirical test of trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships

This study examines three trust-building processes and outcomes in sales manager-salesperson relationships. This study, based on a sample of more than 400 business-to-business salespeoples from a variety of industries, shows two trust-building processes (predictive and identification) to be significantly related to salesperson trust in the sales manager. Interpersonal trust was found to be most strongly related to shared values and respect. Trust was directly related to job satisfaction and relationalism, and indirectly related to organizational commitment and turnover intention. Thomas G. Brashear (brashear@mktg.umass.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. James S. Boles (jboles@gsu.edu) (Ph.D., Louisiana State University) is an associate professor of marketing in the Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a variety of journals, including theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. His areas of research interest include personal selling, sales management, key and strategic account management, and business relationships. Danny N. Bellenger (mktdnb@langate.gsu.edu) (Ph.D., University of Alabama) is currently chairman of the Marketing Department in the Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University. His research has appeared in a number of academic journals including theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of Advertising Research, theCalifornia Management Review, theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, Industrial Marketing Management, and theJournal of Business Research. He has authored four monographs and four textbooks on marketing research, sales, and retailing. Charles M. Brooks (brooks@quinnipiac.edu) (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an associate professor and chair of the Department of Marketing and Advertising at Quinnipiac University. His research has appeared in theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of Retailing, Marketing Theory, and theJournal of Marketing Theory and Practice.     

Production, trade, prices, exchange rates and equilibration in large experimental economies

We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are “international” in economic structure with multiple input, output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents, the economies are characterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described.     

Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of difficulty is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.JEL classifications: Q5, H4, D7, D8An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Resource Economics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, June 2002.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.